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AN ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARENTS, 
TEACHERS, PRINCIPALS, SUPERINTENDENTS, AND SCHOOL 
BOARD MEMBERS RELATING TO ISSUES IMPORTANT 
TO MERIT PAY IMPLEMENTATION 
Abstract of Dissertation 
Purpose: Within school districts groups may be identified 
whose function influences their perceptions about what would 
occur in the schools relative to issues important to merit 
pay implementation. The purpose of the study was to identify 
those differences that exist between groups regarding issues 
relevant to merit pay implementation. 
Procedures: Parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, 
and school board members were drawn from elementary, high 
school, and unified school districts residing in regions 
designated by the Association of California School Adminis-
trators. A survey instrument was developed in order to 
elicit group responses about issues related to merit pay. 
Analyses of variance were carried out to test the hypotheses 
relating to: a) differences between groups and b) 
differences between dimensions identified for the study. In 
addition, an analysis of individual items and pertinent 
supplementary analyses were carried out. 
Results: Teachers rejected the premise that merit pay would 
improve educational productivity and benefit school community 
members. Principals were cognizant of the relationship 
between motivational principles and merit pay, and expressed 
confidence that the reinforcement principles related to 
merit pay would be carried out. All groups were confident 
that school administrators would maintain an effective merit-
pay program. However, the groups were uncertain about what 
evaluation procedures would be employed; the effect merit pay 
would have on incompetent teachers; and how incompetent 
teachers' performance would be improved. 
Conclusions: At this time, the data examined suggest that 
merit pay implementation should be delayed until those 
differences identified between groups are reconciled. 
This does not imply that merit pay implementation should be 
abandoned, but rather, each issue should be examined and 
acted upon carefully. 
Recommendations: Those school districts considering merit 
pay implementation should give consideration to the develop-
ment of standards specifying what the school district's 
outcomes are to be. Within the context of outcomes, the 
development of evaluation procedures that link merit-pay 
awards to outcomes is essential. Therefore, in order to 
establish trust and cooperation within the school district, 
recognizable links between performance outcomes and the 
merit-pay awards are to be firmly established. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Merit pay as a strategy to be used for the 
improvement of educational services, notably teacher 
performance, has resurfaced and has become a public and 
political issue as well as an educational issue. Merit pay, 
however, remains a controversial issue with sides drawn as 
to the strategies to be employed and the acceptability of 
merit pay implementation in the schools. 
School districts, as open systems, are influenced by 
national politics and various professional organizations. 
At the local level, school districts may be divided into 
five principal groups based on the function of each group 
in the school districts' operation. Within each group, 
the perceptions held, with regards to merit pay, will vary 
relative to the group's function, national political 
policies, and affiliations with organizations representing 
each group. 
However desirable merit pay may be from a 
theoretical view, a number of considerations should be 
analyzed prior to the installation of merit-pay programming 
in the schools. Five dimensions play a role in the success 
or failure of merit-pay programs. These are: a) moti-
·vational factors influencing decisions to implement 
merit-pay programs in the schools; b) psychological 
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determinants influencing improved teacher performance; c) 
evaluation criteria to be employed for the measurement of 
teacher performance relating to merit-pay awards; d) 
alternative financial strategies relating to the improve-
ment of functionally incompetent teachers; and e) school 
administrative responsibilities related to successful merit 
pay implementation. 
In order to assure the successful installation of 
merit-pay programs in the schools, an analysis of these 
dimensions, relative to the school district's members' 
perceptions, should be carried out. In effect, agreement 
among parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and 
school board members, with regards to the efficacy of 
merit-pay programming, must be clarified. 
The Problem 
Statement of the Problem 
Two factors influence the individual's decision to 
accept or reject merit-pay programming. Lawler (1971), 
reviewing data collected by Beer and Gery, concluded that 
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·individuals' needs and the situation in which they find 
themselves influence their preferences for merit-pay 
programming. Therefore, the problem of this study was to 
determine if parents', teachers', principals', superin-
tendents', and school board members' perceptions are in 
agreement with regards to: a) motivational factors 
influencing decisions to implement merit-pay programs in the 
schools; b) psychological determinants influencing improved 
teacher performance; c) evaluation criteria to be employed 
for the measurement of teacher performance relating to 
merit-pay awards; d) alternative financial strategies 
related to the improvement of functionally incompetent 
teachers; and e) school administrative responsibilities 
related to merit pay implementation as they perceive what 
would occur in the schools relative to issues comprising 
each dimension. 
Purpose of the Study 
Merit pay has become a recurrent theme perceived as 
a strategy for increasing educational outcomes through the 
improvement of teacher performance. What is not clear, is 
how parents, teachers, principals, superintendents and 
school board members perceive what would occur in the 
schools relative to issues relevant to the successful 
implementation of merit-pay programs in the schools. 
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Two principal reasons necessitate the determination 
of the respondents' perceptual response patterns for each 
of the dimensions identified and the elements within each 
dimension. First, the dimensions are interdependent to the 
extent each dimension must be positively valenced, favorable 
to merit pay implementation. Second, the respondents' 
perceptual response patterns are interdependent in that 
agreement among the respondent classifications--parents, 
teachers, principals, superintendents, and school board 
members--must exist in order to assure successful merit pay 
implementation. 
Therefore, the purpose of the study was to identify 
those points of agreement and disagreement within each 
respondent classification and among the respondent 
classifications. Once these response patterns are 
identified and analyzed, decisions, as to whether efforts 
should be made to reconcile the identified differences or 
to abandon merit-pay programming, can be .made. To do 
otherwise would lead to erroneous assumptions that could 
result in unsuccessful merit pay implementation and 
probable adversive effects on ex~sting teacher performance. 
Hypotheses of the Study 
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Fundamental to the successful implementation of a 
sound merit-pay program is: a) parents, teachers, princi-
pals, superintendents, and school board members must have 
perceptual response patterns that agree with respect to each 
dimension; and b) each dimension identified in the following 
hypotheses must have a positive valence favorable to the 
implementation of the merit-pay program selected. The 
hypotheses of the study are: 
Hypotheses 1: There are no differences among 
parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and 
school board members' perceptions about what would occur in 
the schools relative to dimensions identified for the study. 
Hypothesis 1 1 : There are no differences among 
parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and 
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would 
occur in the schools relative to the motivational factors 
influencing decisions to implement merit-pay programs in 
the schools. 
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Hypothesis 1 2 : There are no differences among 
parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and 
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would 
occur in the schools relative to the psychological 
determinants influencing improved teacher performance. 
Hypothesis 1 3 : There are no differences among 
parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and 
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would 
occur in the schools relative to the evaluation criteria to 
be employed for the measurement of teacher performance 
relating to merit-pay awards. 
Hypothesis 1 4 : There are no differences among 
parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and 
school board members' perceptions with regards to what 
would occur in the schools relative to the alternative 
strategies related to the improvement of functionally 
incompetent teachers.· 
Hypothesis 15 : There are no differences among 
parents', teach~rs', principals', superintendents', and 
school board members' perceptions with regards to what 
would occur in the schools relative to the school 
administrative responsibilities related to merit pay 
implementation. 
Hypotheses 2: There are no differences among the 
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following dimensions as the respondents perceive what would 
occur in the schools with regards to issues relevant to 
merit-pay programming. The dimensions are: a) motivational 
factors influencing decisions to implement merit-pay 
programs in the schools; b) psychological determinants 
influencing improved teacher performance; c) evaluation 
criteria to be employed for the measurement of teacher 
performance relating to merit-pay awards; d) alternative 
financial strategies related to the improvement of 
functionally incompetent teachers; and e) school adminis-
trative responsibilities related to merit pay 
implementation. 
Hypothesis 21 : There are no differences among 
the dimensions listed above with regards to the parents' 
perceptions about what would occur in the schools relative 
to each dimension. 
Hypothesis 22 : There are no differences among 
the dimensions listed above with regards to the teachers' 
perceptions about what would occur in the schools relative 
to each dimension. 
Hypothesis 23 : There are no differences among 
the dimensions listed above with regards to the principals' 
perceptions about what would occur in the schools relative 
to each dimension. 
Hypothesis 2 4 : There are no differences among 
the dimensions listed above with regards to the 
superintendents' perceptions about what would occur in the 
schools relative to each dimension. 
Hypothesis 25 : There are no differences among 
the dimensions listed above with regards to the school 
board members' perceptions about what would occur in the 
schools relative to each dimension. 
Significance of the Study 
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Research in the area of merit pay has been limited 
in quantity and perspective as related to education. Those 
discussions relating to merit pay have frequently referred 
to research conducted outside of education or reflect 
opinions held by var~ous writers. This study provides a 
multi-dimensional collection and analysis of individuals' 
responses focusing on the school community's concepts about 
what would occur in the schools relative to issues important 
to successful merit pay implementation. 
The implementation of merit-pay programs has 
ramifications that are far reaching and have an effect on 
those participants that make up the school community. 
Frequently, programs are developed and implemented that have 
not been well thought-out nor has sufficient consideration 
been given to those groups that have an investment in the 
program implemented. 
Parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and 
school board members have different interests that need to 
be served. However, the success of merit-pay programs 
require that these participants reconcile those differences 
that may exist among them. This study addresses those 
points of agreement and disagreement that may exist among 
parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and school 
board members. 
Definition of Terms 
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The terms used in this study are defined as follows: 
Achievement motivation--behavior that is not easily 
motivated by extrinsic rewards, such as money or symbols 
of awards; performance is motivated when m~asured against 
some standard of excellence. 
Incentive--the product of an externally applied 
stimulus. This stimulus provides the promise of some 
reward which is regarded as having value. 
Incentive wages--wages received by an employee for 
the accomplishment of a specific quantity and/or quality of 
production task. See Merit Pay. 
Incentive wage system--a plan of wage payment that 
relates wages of employees to effort and output, either 
individually or as a group. 
Mentor teacher--a teacher selected whose duties are 
to assist and guide new teachers, assist other teachers, 
provide staff development and develop special curriculum. 
In California, the mentor teacher must teach at least 
60% of the time. 
Merit pay--one of the classes of incentive payments 
that awards extra compensation based on observed performance 
increments but are ancillary to the primary wage scale. 
Merit evaluation--measurement of educational 
productivity or effectiveness through which employees are 
ranked for purposes of distributing merit-pay increments. 
Salary--compensation received by an employee for 
services rendered during a specified time. 
Wages--compensation of employees receiving a stated 
sum per piece, hour, day, or any other unit or period. 
Usually it is all compensation paid including salaries. 
Methodology 
The procedures set forth for the study are 
described under the following headings. They are: 1) 
Population Sample; 2) Research Methodology; 3) Instrument; 
and 4) Analysis of the Data. 
Population Sample 
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The participants for the study were parents, 
teachers, principals, superintendents, and school board 
members drawn from elementary, high school, and unified 
school districts residing in 16 of 18 regions designated by 
the Association of California School Administrators (ACSA 
Members Handbook, 1983-1984). Two regions were omitted 
because they did not meet the criteria establishing that 
each region have an elementary school district, high school 
district, and unified school district. 
Research Methodology 
The school districts selected for the study were 
randomly drawn using stratified random sampling procedures. 
Within each school district, the parents, teachers, and 
school board members were assigned a computer generated 
random number, which was to be used by the superintendents 
as a means for selecting respondents in their school 
districts. Each principal was preselected and drawn from 
the 1984 California Public School Directory prior to the 
distribution of the survey instrument. The selection of 
superintendents corresponded with the selection of the 
school districts. 
A query letter was mailed to the Superintendents 
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of each school district selected for the study. Upon 
receiving confirmation that they would participate in the 
study, a packet containing: a) a letter identifying the 
study; b) respondents to be selected; c) selection and 
distribution procedures; d) provisions for recording the 
respondents; and e) reaffirmation that the results of the 
study would be provided, was returned to each Superintendent. 
In the event a Superintendent did not wish to participate in 
the study, a substitute school district was selected. 
Instrument 
In the absence of an instrument to meet the 
objectives of the study, a survey instrument was constructed. 
The instrument consisted of issues relevant to merit pay 
implementation and were categorized according to five 
dimensions. The dimensions were: 1) Motivational Factors 
Influencing Decisions to Implement Merit-pay Programs in the 
Schools; 2) Psychological Determinants Influencing Improved 
Teacher Performance; 3) Evaluation Criteria to be Employed 
for the Measurement of Teacher Performance Relating to 
Merit-pay Awards; 4) Alternative Financial Strategies 
Related to the Improvement of Functionally Incompetent 
Teachers; and 5) School Administrative Responsibilities 
Related to Merit Pay Implementation. The items were drawn 
from issues directly addressed in the review of the 
literature or related to an issue discussed. 
Analysis of the Data 
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In order to test the hypotheses established for the 
study, five single factor analyses of variance were con-
ducted to determine if differences existed between groups by 
dimension; also, five single factor repeated measures 
analyses of variance were conducted to determine if 
differences existed between dimensions within groups. In 
addition to the analyses of variance, Fisher's Least 
Significant Differences procedures were used to determine 
which group means or dimension means differed when the 
analyses of variance rejected the null hypotheses. 
Under the assumption that individual item response 
differences would not be detected by the analyses of 
variance, an analysis of individual items was carried out. 
Supplementary analyses were conducted with regards to the 
respondents' definition of merit pay, how the respondents' 
perceived merit pay would affect employee relations, sex 
differences, and age differences, whenever these 
distinctions could be made. 
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Organization of the Study 
Presented in Chapter 1 are the problem, purpose and 
procedures of the study. Chapter 2 contains the review of 
the literature, and Chapter 3 includes the research design 
and procedures of the study. A presentation and analysis of 
the data is included in Chapter 4. The conclusions, 
discussion, and recommendations for future research are 
given in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Merit-pay programming, although not new to 
education, has not played, in recent years, a significant 
role in the school districts' compensation planning 
practices. However, those districts giving consideration to 
merit pay implementation must evaluate several dimensions 
that play an important role in the merit-pay program's 
success or failure. Essentially, successful merit pay 
implementation rests upon the degree of agreement among 
parents, teachers, principals, superintendents and school 
board members with regards to: a) who will benefit from 
merit-pay programming; b) the appropriate psychological 
preconditions necessary to facilitate the effectiveness of 
merit-pay programs; c) decisions relating to performance 
evaluations; d) effective alternative incentive programs 
focusing on teacher incompetence; and e) school administra-
tive responsibilities ensuring effective merit-pay program 
implementation. 
Although, merit pay as a concept, more pay for 
improved performance, suggests a relatively simple method 
for ·improving teacher performance, merit pay implementation 
requires a careful examination of numerous factors that will 
affect the merit pay program's effectiveness. Prior to 
merit pay implementation, those factors that are critical 
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to successful merit' pay implementation are to be identified 
and evaluated within the context of personal and 
organizational expectations. By clearly identifying these 
factors and clarifying those points of agreement and 
disagreement among parents, teachers, principals, superin-
tendents, and school board members, decisions can be made. 
about the feasibility of merit pay implementation in the 
schools. 
Each member of the school community contributes to 
the achievement of the school's goals in different ways. 
These may be examined as mutually exclusive events, but 
directed towards the same end, the educational development 
of students. Within the context of the school's function, 
merit-pay program design should account for those 
differences relative to the role played by each member of 
the school community. In order to maximize the potential 
effectiveness of a merit~pay plan, identification of those 
differences that may exist among parents, teachers, 
principals, superintendents, and school board members is 
required. 
The preceding issues and related items are discussed 
under the following dimension categories in this chapter. 
They are: 1) Motivational Factors Influencing Decisions to 
Implement Merit-pay Programs in the Schools; 2) Evaluation 
Criteria to be Employed for the Measurement of Teacher 
Performance Relating to Merit-pay Awards; 3) Psychological 
Determinants Influencing Improved Teacher Performance; 
15 
4) Alternative Financial Strategies Relating to the 
Improvement of Functionally Incompetent Teachers; and 5) 
School Administrative Responsibilities Related to Merit Pay 
Implementation. 
Motivational Factors Influencing 
Decisions to Implement Merit-pay 
Programs in the Schools 
Political Entities. School districts as open 
systems are influenced by: a) political entities either 
seeking ways to retain their political position or b) by 
political entities whose political contribution is directed 
at assisting the school districts achieve their educational 
outcomes. Van Zwoll (1964) suggested the following as 
motives for endorsing merit pay in the schools. First, the 
motive to endorse the merit-pay concept may be to draw 
favorable attention to the political entity or second, to 
divert attention from the installation of favored programs 
not generally acceptable to the public. In either case, 
Van Zwoll contended, the intent is not to primarily improve 
instruction. Furthermore, Kempner (1983) referring to the 
political process observed, "it is unwise to assume that 
people [or groups] rise to greater heights of selflessness 
or self sacrifice" (p. 55). 
Teacher Organizations. In response to the Presi-
dent, other political figures, and political groups, the 
National Education Association (NEA) criticized the motives 
underlying the endorsement of merit-pay programs in the 
schools by suggesting that their motives are politically 
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self-serving (NEA Memo, 1983). Rather than endorsing 
merit-pay programming, the NEA favors general salary 
increases designed to attract and retain qualified teachers. 
Kennedy (1971), Belcher (1974), Sibson (1981) and others 
have pointed out that those objecti~ns and counter-proposals 
raised by unions to merit-pay programs are related to: 
a) maintaining equity among employees or b) maintaining 
control over various management perogatives. By placing an 
emphasis on general salary increases, the NEA is able to 
satisfy the above and maintain the support of its 
membership. With regards to this point, Uzell (1983) 
contended, the NEA, "knows he is not there to represent the 
minority of superior teachers but the vast majority of 
nonsuperior teachers" (p. 24). 
In essence, the NEA strongly opposes merit pay 
implementation in the schools primarily because merit-pay 
awards, by design, will not be distributed to all teachers. 
Instead of block distributions of salary increases that are 
the same for each level based on senority, the NEA argues 
that merit pay prepresents increases that are pyramidal in 
form (NEA Memo, 1983). That is, as the apex of the pyramid 
is approached, fewer teachers will receive increases. 
However, the fundamental purpose of merit-pay programs is 
to stimulate improved performance of all employees, not 
specifically to reward existing performance excellence. In 
contrast to the pyramidal distribution of financial rewards 
as described by the NEA, an inverted pyramidal distribution 
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of financial rewards is conceivable, provided management has 
the desire to support the teacher's increased financial 
success, as well as achieve improved educational productive-
ness. The American Federation of Teachers (AFT), similarily, 
does not openly endorse merit-pay programming. But, in 
contrast to the NEA, recognizes that merit pay will be an 
issue to be dealt with during negotiations with some school 
districts. As a consequence of this awareness, tne AFT has 
defined the conditions under which merit-pay programming is 
acceptable. These are: 
1. substantially higher pay for all teachers. 
2. negotiated evaluation procedures that offer 
protection against subjectivity and local 
school politics. 
3. no sanctions against teachers who do not 
receive extra pay. 
4. an appeal and review procedure for teachers 
who are not selected for merit pay. 
5. eligibility for extra pay available to all 
teachers. 
6. any extra pay or status should not be 
subject to diminution. 
7. evaluation plans should not be simplistic 
or based merely on student achievement tests 
but reflect the complexity of all the 
factors contributing to teacher and student 
success. 
8. plans should only be adopted if they are 
acceptable through the collective bargaining 
process. (American Teacher, 1983, p. 23) 
Parents. Two principal issues have led education 
reformers to perceive merit pay implementation as a remedy 
for the schools' poor performance. These are: a) 
dissatisfaction with educational institutions (Newton, 
1982), and b) the inability of the schools to compete with 
the private sector (Education USA, 1984). Given that 
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dissatisfaction with educational institutions stems from 
poor performance by capable teaching personnel, merit pay is 
a viable consideration. Should the attraction and retention 
of quality teaching personnel be the issue, merit pay is, at 
best, only a partial solution. Careful analysis and 
determination of teacher quality is imperative in order to 
make correct decisions relating to the methods of compen-
sation required to improve teacher performance. An attempt 
to present confused or misrepresented purposes for or 
against merit pay implementation, without realistic 
assessment of teacher quality, will further erode the 
support for education by parents, who, according to Newton 
(1982) are already skeptical of current performance 
evaluation practices. 
Two important points have been identified regarding 
parents' opinions relating to merit pay and accompanying 
increased finances for education. First, according to the 
1983 Gallup Poll and Newsweek poll, 61 and 80 percent of the 
parents respectively indicate support for merit pay 
implementation in the schools. Second, 70 percent of the 
parents surveyed by the Gallup Poll indicated they would be 
willing to pay higher taxes if it would raise the standard 
of education. There appears to be reasonable evidence to 
suggest that public support for ~erit pay implementation 
exists, provided the increases granted to teachers are 
related to increased performance. This last point is 
especially critical to the effective implementation of 
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merit-pay programs. The costs of merit pay implementatiqn 
are high and justifiable only if accompanying gains in 
performance warrant the costs. Sibson (1981) pointed out 
that the relative costs, when corresponding performance 
increases occur, are low. Sibson, Lawler (1974), and others 
have also pointed out that the relative costs of merit pay 
implementation are excessive and wasteful when the 
objectives of merit pay implementation do not correspond to 
improved performance. 
On the negative side, however, Friedman (1983) 
contended merit pay in the schools will not work because; 
parents do not directly pay for the services as is the case 
in the private sector. Thus, parents are unable to control 
the school districts in order to make their wants heard. 
Belcher (1974) has suggested in contrast, public policy sets 
the floors and sometimes the ceilings on financial rewards 
even though the public does not play a role in the internal 
distribution of rewards. 
Teachers. Teachers over the past years have 
developed a distrust for merit-pay programming. However, 
according to the National School Board Association survey, 
approximately two-thirds of those teachers surveyed favored 
payment plans based upon classroom performance (NSBA, 1983) . 
Stress on classroom performance results from the criticism 
frequently made by teachers, as well as employees in the 
private sector, that merit-pay increments are frequently 
distributed on.the basis of factors other than performance--
essentially favoritism. 
Assessment of the NSBA findings requires further 
analysis in light of interest expressed in the application 
of the merit-pay concept in education. A number of 
variables have been identified that-impact on beliefs 
workers in the private sector hold with regards to merit 
pay. These are: 
1. incentive plans result in speed up, 
2. rates will be cut if increased earnings are 
made under the plan, 
3. incentive plans encourage competition among 
workers and the discharge of slow workers, 
4. incentive plans result in unemployment through 
working yourself out of a job, 
5. workers do not get their share of increased 
productivity, 
6. incentive plans are too complex, 
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7. standards are set unfairly, 
8. earnings fluctuations make it difficult to 
budget household expenditures,. 
9. incentive plans incr~ase the strain on the 
worker and may impair his health, 
10. incentive plans are used to avoid a deserved 
wage increase, 
11. incentive plans increase the frequency of 
method changes, 
12. incentive plans ask workers to do more than 
a "fair days work," and 
13. incentive plans imply a lack of trust in 
workers by management. (Belcher, 1974, p. 309) 
In addition to the above deterrents to successful 
merit pay implementation, teachers and teacher associations 
frequently cite the following as a basis for not accepting 
merit-pay programming. First, inequity in the distribution 
of merit-pay increases. Second, evaluation procedures are 
either nonexistent and/or difficult to develop. Third, 
security in the form of wage increments for all teachers 
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rather than a select few. Collectively, whether the 
teacher perceives merit-pay programming as a vehicle for 
gaining personal benefits is a function of the above 
variables influence with reference to: a) organizational 
motive; b) organizational ability to administer the program 
appropriately.; and c) how teachers needs are satisfied 
within the organization. 
In general, merit-pay programs are to be designed to 
recognize and reward those exceptional performers who 
contribute to the organization's outcomes in a significant 
way. Van Zwoll (1964) and Newman and Logan (1976) have 
indicated negative aspects found in some merit-pay programs 
directed at: a) maintaining a ceiling on salary increases 
and b) exploitation of the worker. Essentially, effective 
merit-pay programs should be designed to eliminate the 
perceived manipulation of the employees and according to 
Townsend (1984), maximize the program's motivational 
potential by eliminating suspicion, loss of understanding, 
and loss of trust. 
Evaluation Criteria to be Employed 
for the Measurement of Teacher Per-
formance Relating to Merit-pay Awards 
Explicit to the merit pay concept is that the 
measures used for determining merit-pay eligibility are 
performance. Sibson stated, "Therefore, the first essential 
step in any merit-pay program is supervisory evaluation of 
employee performance" (1981, p. 104). This position is in 
contrast to evaluations for employment, retention, and 
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dismissal, which may include a number of factors, of which, 
performance is only one factor. 
The key to rewarding performance is to make correct 
judgements about it. This implies that the exact method by 
which performance is rated does not matter as long as it 
gets valid results (Sibson, 1984) . Caution must be taken, 
however, not to confuse performance measurements that 
relate to merit-pay awards with general evaluative measure-
ments. With regards to performance rating, the issue is not 
a question of subjective versus objective measurements, but 
failure to design performance measures specific to merit-pay 
programming (Sibson, 1981). Newman and Logan (1976) identi-
fied five conditions that are important to the design of 
effective incentive wage policies. These are: 
1. The final results must truly reflect the effect 
of the worker. 
2. All important elements that are subject to the 
control of the worker should either be included 
in the compensation plan or controlled for by 
other means. 
3. The method of computing must be simple enough 
so that employees can readily understand it. 
4. The effect of good performance on the amount 
of compensation should become apparent quickly 
so that the worker realizes the importance of 
good performance. 
4. The confidence and cooperation of the employee 
should be secured. (Newman and Logan, 1976, 
p. 245) 
Two organizational factors may influence the type of 
evaluation strategies employed by service organizations. 
First, since schools are service institutions and typically 
paid out of budget, their emphasis will be on behaviors that 
23 
assure protection of the budget (Drucker, 1974). Drucker 
added, this behavior centers around "good intentions and 
programs," rather than what produces the contribution. 
Second, Anthony (1981), relating to government and educa-
tion, suggested that the reason for continued "fuzzy" 
performance measures result from not putting enough time or 
effort required for the development of better performance 
measures. Given the opinions of Drucker (1974), Ingster 
(1972), and others, unions and employee associations do 
little to bring about changes resulting in precise perfor-
mance measures. According to Ingster (1972) unions (and 
employee associations) are particularly opposed to the use 
of performance appraisals for making administrative 
decisions about promotions, layoffs, or wage increases. He 
added, unions contend that more experienced workers are 
more effective because of their familiarity with the job to 
be done. In effect, "Unions say long service means better 
work" (Ingster, 1972, p. 5-27). Shils (1972) also pointed 
out that unions favor the principle of job difficulty and 
responsibility as the criteria for more pay. However, 
through collective bargaining in the schools, Uzell, (1983) 
contended that the emphasis would continue to be more pay 
for more work rather than more pay for better work. 
Linking organizational exgectatirm~s_(_Cas_te~tter_, ____ _ 
1981) and the conditions set forth by Newman and Logan 
(1976) with the emphasis on performance provides a basis for 
determining those teacher performances that are measurable 
within the context of merit-pay programming. The thrust 
behind the establishment of performance measures lies 
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simply in the recognition that different evaluation 
strategies are required to satisfy different objectives--
where performance objectives are different in focus than are 
membership objectives (Belcher, 1974). 
Measurement of employee performance, relative to 
merit pay, are to be based on "results" (Haworth, 1972) or, 
in other words, "outputs" rather than "inputs" (Belcher, 
1974). Thus, Belcher added, an assumption can be made that 
one or a few measurements of out.put represents the perfor-
mance contributions required by the organization. 
White (1983) argued that there was no one best 
system of instruction, and the definition of what makes an 
effective or outstanding teacher for the comparison of 
teachers is fraught with problems. White's position differs 
from Haworth and Belcher in emphasis. According to the 
distinction between inputs and outputs, methods of 
instruction and teacher attributes represent inputs through 
which outputs are assumed to follow. In the researcher's 
opinion, a counter argument may be proposed pointing out 
that although method and outcomes are associated, there is 
no assurance that this association holds for all cases. In 
addition, evaluations based on method may, in fact, be 
biased by the evaluator's preference of one method over 
another, despite the fact, that alternative methods achieve 
the same or improved results (outputs). A more consistent 
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evaluative procedure would be to determine those outputs to 
be achieved which are important to the organization, and 
then measure performance relative to these outputs. 
However, the NEA and the AFT appear to reject performance 
measures relating to the performance of students which is 
the measure of teacher effectiveness in terms of output--to 
cause a change in student behavior. Haworth (1972) has 
pointed out, relative to the above discussion that incentive 
plans are designed to play a causal role as well as reward 
the effect. Essentially, merit pay focuses on the payment 
of performance only, whereas membership pay focuses on the 
attributes (inputs) that the individual brings into the 
organization, of which, performance is only one 
consideration. 
Within the scope of the preceding discussions, much 
of the conflict evolving around what is to be evaluated and 
who will do the evaluations, can be eliminated through the 
communication of expectations and the degree that these 
expectations can be met, relative to teacher performance. 
Haworth (1972) stressed that the incentive plan provides a 
basis for communication not found in other compensation 
components. Dinsmore (1972) extends this position further, 
emphasizing that the incentive plan is a system of 
communication as well as a system of Compensation. In 
effect, a communication link established among the 
constituents within the school district would allow the 
identification of the criteria that is to make the 
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school district's evaluation procedures. This can be 
accomplished by: a) parents and school board members 
establishing the school district's performance expectations; 
b) principals and central office administrators clarifying 
the reality of achieving those performance objectives in 
relationship to the availability of personnel and 
resources; and c) teachers defining those work elements that 
are under their direct control. By clearly defining the 
school district's performance expectations and determination 
of those performance expectations that are achievable by 
which the teacher is solely responsible, it is the opinion 
of the researcher that teacher performance evaluation can be 
carried out by representatives from each of the school 
district's special interest groups, provided the measures 
used for teacher evaluation are performance outputs not 
performance inputs. 
Psychological Determinants 
Influencing Improved Teacher 
Performance 
Compensation programs developed and implemented by 
school districts have focused primarily on salary consider-
ations and collateral benefits; whereas, organizations 
outside education, frequently include incentive payments as 
a necessary component of the total compensation package. 
Should school districts decide to implement merit-pay 
programming, three separate but interrelated components 
are to be analyzed prior to the district's announcement of 
their total compensation policy. 
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Salary, collateral benefits, and incentive payments 
have distinct focal points that should be clearly recognized 
in order to prevent confusion and misunderstandings, and to 
serve as a basis for decisions regarding evaluation 
strategies. Salaries represent periodic payments made to 
employees, represent fixed costs to the organization, and 
are the basis for administering other forms of compensation 
(Sibson, 1981). Collateral benefits as defined by 
Castetter are: 
direct or indirect forms of compensation initiated 
by the board of education generally on the behalf 
of all personnel, which do not require additional 
services to be performed. (1981, p. 36) 
Merit pay, a form of incentive payment, represents those 
payments made in recognition for performances that exceed 
the organizations's basic performance requirements. 
Fundamentally, total compensation programs serve a 
number of purposes. First, compensation is a management 
method that contributes to the effective management of the 
organization (Sibson, 1981). Second, competitive compen-
sation programs enhance the organization's ability to 
attract, retain, and motivate employees. Third, reasonable 
wage levels increase the effectiveness of incentive-pay 
pr6grams installed as part of the organization's total 
compensation program (Haworth, 1972). Fourth, as a reward, 
compensation can be used to make employees feel satisfied 
with their job and gain their commitment to the 
organization (Lawler, 1971). Fifth, sound compensation 
programs account for the employee's perceptions as to how 
their standard of living is affected (Dunn and Rachel, 
1976), their status in society (Castetter, 1981), the 
employee's self esteem and their perceived worth to the 
organization (Sibson, 1981) . 
Currently, emphasis in the schools is placed 
primarily on basic salary considerations, which include 
extra-duty benefits, and collateral benefits. Generally 
speaking, salaries possess incentive value, but primarily 
focus on the attraction of new employees and the retention 
of those currently employed by the school district by 
providing satisfying salary structures. However, Lawler 
(1971) stresse~ that pay satisfaction does not influence 
performance very strongly and should not be a major 
consideration when pay satisfaction is discussed. 
Collateral benefits, according to Brunker (1982), have 
generally represented rewards for membership in the 
organization rather than for performance. Furthermore, 
Lawler (1971) pointed out that employees do not always 
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value the fringe benefits they receive. Assuming that 
current salary structures are reasonably set, including 
collateral benefits, incentive payments as a method for 
improving teacher performance in the school district need to 
be examined. 
Two principal reasons underlying the rationale for 
including incentive payments as part of the total compensa-
tion package are: a) to motivate increased teacher 
performance, usually above the standard of acceptable 
performance set forth during salary determination, and b) 
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to reward those teachers who perform above the acceptable 
standard. Using the distinction between performance and 
learning made by Tolman (1949) and Bandura (1~74), incentive 
plans may be examined either as performance-based plans or 
learning-b~sed plans. Performance-based ~lans indlude 
merit-pay programs and other financial or nonfinancial plans 
that directly reward improved performance. Learning-based 
plans include master teacher/career ladder and mentor 
teacher plans in which emphasis is on the acquisition of 
new knowledge and skills. Payment is made principally on 
these new acquisitions and increased performance is presumed 
to be a result of these knowledge and skill acquisitions. 
(See Alternative Financial Strategies Related to the 
Improvement of Functionally Incompetent Teachers.) 
Merit-pay systems, as performance-based plans, are 
seen from a management perspective as, "management practices 
designed to relate differences in pay for the same job to 
differences in work performance" (Sibson, 1981) . In effect, 
merit-pay programming means giving a superior performer a 
wage increase and denying a poor performer a similar 
increase (Anthony, 1981). Alternatively, from an employee's 
perspective, merit-pay programming gives the employee an 
opportunity to earn more in relation to their increased 
performance, where, according to Dunn and Rachel (1974), 
"differences in ability, motivation, and output are 
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automatically recognized and rewarded accordingly" (p. 241). 
Haworth (1972) described effective incentive-payment 
plans as those systems that clearly define the results to be 
achieved; carry out periodic reporting; build a desire for 
remedial improvement; and establish communications to a 
degree not possible in most other compensation package 
components. A number of prerequisites have been identified 
that are necessary for effective incentive-pay plans. The 
following prerequisites are comprehensive and include 
elements identified by other writers. They are: 
1. Adequate competitive floors (salary and wage) 
and security areas (benefits) on top of which 
incentives can produce variable inco~es. 
2. Significant individual or group impact on 
important results. 
3. Measurable results. 
4. Reasonable time spans. 
5. Management committment to the program. 
6. A salubrious climate in which striving 
towards group or individual excellence 
is applauded. (Haworth, 1972, p. 7-5) 
Organizations that have not implemented some form of 
incentive pay program must rely solely on salaries and 
collateral benefits as the primary incentives to induce 
increased performance. The weakness to be found in the use· 
of salaries and collateral benefits as incentives directed 
at improving performance, lies in the fact, that the 
performance expectations are predetermined, and the ability 
to increase performance is severely limited. Three major 
reasons contribute to these restrictions on salary and 
collateral benefits as effective incentives. First, the 
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performance expectancies are set by mutual agreement between 
management and employee. That is, the salary represents 
what management is willing to pay, or able to pay, for the 
performance expected and the employee's rate of production 
in turn for a specified salary. Second, salaries and 
collateral benefits have become rights that accrue as a 
condition of employment. Third, salaries do not 
specifically relate to performance but include other 
factors. Therefore, adjusting salary and collateral 
benefits, once established, will not improve performance, 
unless, taken away or significantly reduced. 
If increased performance is the objective of 
management, implementation of an incentive program is called 
for. However, the effectiveness of incentive programs rely 
on the recognition and application of a number of psycho-
logical principles. These are discussed under the 
following: 1) Mechanics of Applied Psychology and 2) 
Identification of Effective Incentives. 
Mechanics of Applied Psychology. Successful 
implementation of a viable merit-pay program requires that 
those school administrators in charge of the distribution of 
awards and maintainance of merit-p~y programs possess a 
functional understanding of reinforcement theory and 
practices. With respect to the issues of ~dministering 
rewards, Castetter (1981) expressed the following: 
Until there is greater administrative and technical 
rationality in the operation of reward systems, the 
greater the likelihood that the single-salary 
schedule ... will continue to shape compensation 
for a majority of professional people. (p. 36) 
Functionally, merit-pay programs follow the 
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reinforcement paradigm set forth by Skinner (1954). Within 
the operant conditioning scheme, each time a significant 
increase in performance is noted a reinforcement is given. 
Th~ significant feature of operant conditioning as the 
procedure relates to merit pay is, financial incentives 
follow observed performance. Critical to this procedure 
are: a) the reinforcement must be associated with the 
performance specified by the merit-pay program (Lawler 
1971); b) the reinforcement must follow the desired 
performance within a reasonable time span (Newman and Logan, 
1976); and c) the employee must be aware of and understand 
the organization's performance expectations (Haworth, 1972; 
Dinsmore, 1972; and Dunn and Rachel, 1974). 
Within the scope of the operant conditioning 
principles, schedules of reinforcement are to be given full 
consideration. First, continuous reinforcement is an 
effective method for achieving temporary rapid gains in 
performance. Negatively, the performance curve reaches a 
plateau and eventually declines following successive 
continuous reinforcements. Ratio and interval scheduling 
provides a viable alternative for maintaining high levels 
of performance, where the interval scheduling stabalizes 
performance more effectively in between reinforcements 
(Ferster and Skinner, 1957). Difficulties arise as a result 
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of management's manipulation of ratio and interval 
schedules. Should the employee perceive ratios of 
reinforcement that are not appropriate to the performance 
differences among employees, dissension may result. If, in 
the event of interval scheduling, the intervals become 
spaced too far apart, extinction occurs, thereby adversely 
affecting performance by reducing the performance level or 
causing the performan~e to cease entirely. 
Identification of Effective Incentives. Correct 
decisions made about the type of incentives to be employed 
to motivate increased performance is critical to any 
incentive plan. The ability of the plan to maximize 
performance is contingent on the selection of those 
incentives appropriate to the personnel in the organization. 
An absence of careful analysis and correct selection of 
incentives, at this point, may fail to cause improvement in 
performance or result in the deterioration of existing 
performance levels. 
Two basic incentive types may be utilized to 
motivate increased performance. Van Zwoll (1964) classified 
these incentives as "financial" and "nonfinancial" 
incentives. Under the heading of financial incentives are 
those direct monetary rewards linked to excellence in 
performance. The acquisition of material goods according to 
Drucker (1974) is the primary basis that cause monetary 
rewards to be extremely powerful and pervasive. He added, 
due to the increasing costs of material goods, monetary 
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rewards continue to be the primary mechanism influencing 
employee performance. Lawler (1971) stressed, although pay 
can be a powerful motivator of perform~nce, pay's role is 
that of a secondary reinforcer. Under these circumstances 
he added, if the needs with which pay is associated are 
satisfied by other means, pay has little or no effect on 
performance. 
Sibson (1981) and Van Zwoll (1974) also recognize 
the importance of financial incentives as a primary 
motivational force. However, these writers, as well as 
Dunn and Rachel (1971), recognize that financial incentives 
are not always the key incentives of choice. Sibson (1981) 
pointed out that for all workers, at least, at one time in 
their working careers, financial gain is the principal 
motivator. Dunn and Rachel (1971) also pointed out that 
there will be variances in the employee's need for 
additional financial resources, at which time monetary 
gains will be most effective and have the highest incentive 
value. Implied is as one set of the individual's needs are 
satisfied, incentives will need to be changed if further 
performance increases are to be realized. 
The selection of the appropriate incentive is a 
complex issue within the organization. First, a group of 
employees will be readily motivated by the choice to gain 
additional financial benefits, primarily because the 
financial benefits satisfy their basic needs (Van Zwoll, 
1964). Second, a group of employees will look for 
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nonfinancial incentives for the satisfaction of higher-
order needs (Lawler, 1971). Third, the remaining members 
of the organization may look at financial gain as a measure 
of their success, and in a sense use these monetary gains 
as a "score card" measuring their achievements within the 
organization (Dunn and Rachel, 1971). 
Financial and nonfinancial incentives play a 
critical role depending on the following three factors. 
First, should the employee wish to satisfy higher-order 
needs as defined by Maslow's hierarchy of needs, 
nonfinancial incentives may be the incentive of choice in 
some cases. Second, those employees having a high need 
for achievement may actually be affronted by financial 
inducements, unless, they are being used by the individual 
to measure achievement. In contrast, however, those 
employees with low achievement needs are positively 
influenced by financial incentives (Dunn and Rachel, 1971). 
Third, the need for affiliation is a powerful factor with 
respect to employee performance. This simply implies that 
those with which the employee works must satisfy the need 
for interpersonal relationships. 
Nine basic factors have been identified by Sibson 
that provide a basis for evaluating those preconditions 
necessary for the implementation of effective merit-pay 
programs. They are: 
1. Fair pay. 
2. Reasonable benefits. 
3. Job security. 
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4. Fair treatment on the job. 
5. Opportunity to get ahead. 
6. Proper handling of questions and grievances. 
7. Opportunity to do a job well. 
8. Safe working conditions. 
9. A good employer. (Sibson, 1981, p. 167) 
Each of the above factors should exist in order to 
assure that the financial incentives will induce the 
employees to improve their performance. The absence of one 
or more of these factors, except fair pay and reasonable 
benefits such as medical plans, should alert management that 
a careful examination of nonfinancial incentives is required 
prior to merit pay implementation. Collectively, these 
factors promote satisfaction with the organization. 
However, factor 1 is critical because according to Haworth 
(1972), in order to motivate the employee to take the risk 
relative to incentive increments, fluctuations relative to 
outputs must not jeopardize the individu~l's livelihood. 
In retrospect, financial incentives may play an 
important role in the motivation of teachers to improve 
their performance. The importance of money, however, is 
governed by employee needs and the ability of money to 
satisfy these needs. Without careful analysis of these 
variables prior to merit pay implementation, the merit-pay 
program's effectiveness is questionable. 
Alternative Financial Strategies 
Related to the Improvement of 
Functionally Incompetent Teachers 
Incompetent employees represent a concern that 
organizations must contend with. Unfortunately, the 
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practices employed, other than dismissal or retraining, are 
costly in terms of the financial resources expended and the 
effects incompetent employees have on competent employees' 
performance. Anthony (1981) pointed out that the 
incompetent employees are great consumers of time for the 
following reasons: a) they make mistakes that others must 
correct; b) they work slowly and miss deadlines, which holds 
up other people; c) they can not solve problems themselves; 
and d) they manage the manager's time if allowed to. In 
Gffect, Anthony described the incompetent employee as one 
who simply can not get the job done right on time. They 
lack the skills, interests, aptitudes, ability, or motiva-
tion in some combination to properly perform the job. 
Given the NEA's position that the quality of 
teaching personnel in the schools is declining (NEA Memo, 
1983) and the emphasis advocates of reform on merit pay as 
a way to keep good teachers from leaving and to attract 
more able teachers (Education USA, 1984), one might be 
inclined to conclude that incompetence is a serious issue to 
be dealt with by the educational community. 
Merit pay is conceptualized as a method to be used 
for increasing performance excellence while, at the same 
time, not rewarding poor performance (Anthony, 1981). 
However, merit-pay programming assumes that the capacity to 
perform exists but that the performance is not demonstrated. 
With respect to this point, Lawler (1971) pointed out that 
employees perform at 50-60 percent of their full capacity. 
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Thus the rationale for performance related incentive 
payments. 
According to Education USA (1984) the National 
Commission on Excellence in Education emphasized, " ... 
superior teachers can be rewarded, average ones encouraged, 
and poor ones either improved or terminated" (p. 38). 
Brown (1982) supplemented this position by suggesting that 
the "deadwood who do not contribute significantly would be 
weeded out" (p. 32). Unfortunately, as Anthony (1981) has 
pointed out, incompetence is not an absolute, but varies in 
degree relative to the following factors~ These are: 
1. Insufficient training to perform the job. 
2. Poor job placement. The person is in the 
wrong job. 
3. A lack of direction from above. 
4. A lack of aptitude and/or ability to do the job 
regardless of the amount or type of training 
provided. 
5. A lack of interest in the job. 
6. A lack of feedback on performance. The person 
does not know whether the job is being 
performed properly or not and repeats the 
same mistakes. 
7. Inadequate physical resources--tools, space, 
equipment, energy, and so on. 
8. Incompetent subordinates. 
9. A lack of adequate support staff for planning. 
10. An incompetent superior. 
11. A poorly defined job and associated job 
standards. 
12. A lack of clear agreement between superior and 
subordinate job expectations. (p. 15) 
In addition to these factors, consideration should 
be given to: a) are the teacher's efficacy expectations 
consonant to good performance (Bandura, 1977); b) are 
organizational expectations consistent with production 
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related performance expectations (Drucker, 1974) ~ c) does 
management strive to achieve organizational productiveness~ 
and d) are employees conditioned by work (Kempener, 1982). 
Essentially, the identification of incompetency requires 
that the determination of incompetency be made in view of 
organizational activities and processes as well as the 
teacher's weaknesses leading to incompetence. 
Each of the above require strategies other than 
merit-pay programming. These strategies fall within the 
scope of learning-based incentive plans. In order for 
noticeable changes in employee performance to occur, the 
teacher must acquire the appropriate knowledge and/or skills 
required to initiate performance improvements, or the 
organization must clarify its performance expectations 
relative to the outcomes desired. Without substantive 
behavior changes in these areas, merit pay will do little to 
motivate increased performance. 
Currently, two alternatives to merit-pay programming 
have either been proposed or implemented in the schools. 
Although the focus of these plans is not on the improvement 
of incompetent teacher performance, the mechanics of these 
plans provide a basis by which prescriptive strategies can 
be developed for the correction of teacher incompetency. 
They are: 1) Master Teacher/Career Ladder Plans, and 2) 
Mentor Teacher Plans. 
Master Teacher/Career Ladder Plans. Master 
teacher/career ladder plans are extensions and modifications 
of existing salary structures. To a large extent these 
plans follow Merit System plans which are based on classi-
fication where salary advancements are principally 
associated with experience, education, and skill growth. 
The assumption underlying these plans are that both 
experience and the acquisition of knowledge and/or skill 
growth qualifies the teacher for advancement to a 
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succeeding higher level in the classification system. In 
summarizing these plans, Uzell (1983) noted two additional 
criteria for advancement--attendance and superior perfor-
mance evaluation. The two plans currently cited as examples 
of these strategies are the Florida Plan (Uzell, 1983) and 
the Master Teacher Plan advocated by Alexander (1983). 
Alexander stressed that the plan he endorses would 
make it easier to remove the really incompetent teachers 
because a record of their performance will be maintained. 
"However, Anthony (1981) pointed out that, frequently, incom-
petence is not the fault of the employee, and when 
incompetence is attributable to the individual, incompetent 
performance may be correctable. In effect, he added, the 
managers have the primary responsibility to manage 
incompetence even when the subordinate is somewhat 
responsible (p. 17). Drucker (1974) has further suggested 
that the organization has a moral obligation to deal 
effectively with incompetence. Principally, Drucker 
contended that the stability and productiveness of the 
organization depended on the proper management of 
incompetence. 
Two key factors found in the master teacher plans 
play an important role with respect to the improvement of 
incompetent teachers performance. First, the performance 
evaluation should assess the teacher in these areas: a) 
inputs (Masse, 1983); Belcher, 1974)--what the teacher 
brings into the learning situation; b) processes and 
operational settings (Masse, 1983)--what methods and 
conditions prevail to promote learning; and c) outputs 
(Masse, 1983; Belcher, 1974)--how the students behavior 
has been changed as a result of the teacher's efforts. 
Second, if the outputs do not meet the organization's 
expectations, what knowledge and skills are required to 
satisfy these expectations. 
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In order for the plan to have an effect on improved 
teacher performance, the expectations evaluations should be 
made in conjunction with the twelve causes of incompetence, 
· which includes management incompetence and the consideration 
of incompetent colleagues. In essence, incompetence, is to 
be determined relative to the individual, his colleagues, 
and the supervision received. 
Mentor Teacher Plans. Mentor teacher plans focus on 
the selection of teachers whose primary responsibility is to 
supervise new teachers or teachers who have less 
experience or effective teaching skills. Functionally, the 
mentor teacher serves as a model by which the organization's 
expectations are transmitted. Mentor teacher plans, as 
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modeling procedures, can be examined in context with 
research conducted by Bandura. 
Prior to the implementation of a modeling strategy 
a number of conditions must be met before notable changes in 
behavior can occur. Bower and Hilgard {1981} reviewed four 
processes identified by Bandura that have an effect on the 
behavior of the individual through the model. These are: 
a) the model stimulus must be attended by the individual; 
b) the subject must be able to code the stimulus event 
symbolically; c) the subject must be able to reproduce the 
events; and d) reinforcement related to that obtained by the 
model must be apparent to the individual. This implies that 
the subject will be rewarded similarily to the model, or the 
expectation that similar reinforcements will be forth 
coming. 
In effect, the preceding processes establish the 
environment in which modeling is to take place and 
identifies those capacities that the individual must 
possess before behavior changes through modeling are to 
occur. Relevant to these processes are factors that have 
been identified by Bower and Hilgard (1981) as they relate 
to Bandura's research. They are: 
High status models are more imitated. 
Imitation induced in the subject decreases as 
the model is made more dissimilar to a real 
person. 
The more complex the skills, the poorer the 
the degree of imitation after one observation 
trial. 
Rewarded behavior of the models is more likely 
to be imitated. 
5. Instruction given to the [individual] before 
he observes the model provides high or low 
motivation to learn the model'~ behavior. 
(Bower and Hilgard, 1981, p. 463) 
Tolman (1949) focused primarily on the organism's 
expectancy that a given action will lead to a given 
consequence. That is, to the extent that an outcome 
contingent on an action is desired and expected, that 
action will be selected and activated. Bandura (1977) has 
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further suggested that the organism has the conviction that 
it can execute the behavior required to produce outcomes. 
Essentially, the preconditions described above as they 
relate to the environmental setting and characteristics of 
the individual, four additional factors come into play with 
respect to the individual's responses to the model. They 
are: 
1. Past accomplishments of one's own behavior. 
2. Observing others successes and failures with 
the behavior. 
3. Verbal persuassion by self and others. 
4. Changes in one's emotional arousal in the 
target situation. (Bower and Hilgard, 1974, 
p. 470) 
A number of variables come into play with respect to 
the effective use of modeling strategies. Critical to the 
model's success in changing behavior are the environmental 
setting, the capacities of the individual to learn and 
reproduce the model's behavior, the individual'~ efficacy 
expectations, and the reinforcement expected. 
Master teacher/career ladder and mentor teacher 
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plans provide the school administrators with an opportunity 
to deal effectively with incompetence within the school 
system. First, performance weaknesses are identified and 
assignment to the most effective plan can be selected. 
Second, legal and moral obligations to employees can be 
.excercised. Third, the responsibility to improve perfor-
mance becomes the teacher's responsibility, being more 
desirable than dismissal. More important, however, would be 
the improved relations resulting from taking steps that 
would improve a teacher's likelihood of receiving future 
merit-pay increments. 
School Administrative Responsibilities 
Related to Merit Pay Implementation 
Prior to the implementation of merit-pay program-
ming, administrative personnel charged with the maintainence 
of the program should have clearly in mind: a) how the 
participants--parents, teachers, principals, superinten-
dents, and school board members--perceive the benefits they 
are to receive from the program's implementation; b) the 
potency of financial ·incentives to motivate performance 
increases; c) which incentive strategy will promote the 
greatest organizational productiveness; d) clear 
definitions of evaluation procedures appropriate to the 
incentive plan selected; and e) the fundamental purposes of 
salaries, collateral benefits, and incentive payments. To 
a large extent, the confidence, cooperation, and reduction 
of dissension resulting from merit-pay programming can be 
achieved once these factors have been given careful 
consideration. 
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Once a determination has been made establishing that 
the preconditions satisfy the requirements necessary for 
successful installation of merit-pay programming, management 
will need to evaluate a number of administrative practices 
that play an important role in the succes~ful implementa-
tion of merit-pay programming. The critical focus in this 
assessment relates to the level of trust and cooperativeness 
that can be instilled in the employee. 
Lawler (1971), Belcher (1974), and Brunker (1982) 
emphasized the importance of fitting the organization's pay 
system with the organization's human relations climate and 
management style. In relation to the organizational 
climate, Belcher (1974) and Brunker (1982) as well as 
Lawler have pointed out that in order to maintain an 
effective incentive pay plan, some form of participative 
management practice is desirable to effectively tie pay to 
performance. This position has been stressed by Lawler 
despite the fact that the authoritarian management style has 
given emphasis to the use of pay to motivate performance. 
Sibson (1981) further suggested that the merit-pay plan not 
be used as a substitute for sound management practices. 
This implies that merit-pay programs be highly visible to 
employees and to achieve this visibility, management is 
required to utilize management practices that involve 
employees in the merit-pay program's development. 
Participative management plays an important role 
with regards to establishing the tie between pay and 
performance in several ways. First, participative manage-
ment provides an openness that allows employees to express 
their needs and what is to be expected from the program. 
Second, issues relating to pay secrecy are minimized since 
the worker plays an important role in the determination of 
merit-pay rates and standards determination. Third, 
participative evaluations reduce the tendency to award 
merit-pay increments for reasons other than performance. 
Fourth, the employees achieve a sense of purpose in the 
organization since the employees perceive themselves as 
causal agents in the determination and achievement of the 
organization's objectives. 
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Within the scope of participative management a 
number of factors are to be considered. Lawler (1971) 
suggested that pay be made public and that participative 
appraisals be carried out. With respect to pay secrecy, 
Drucker (1974) commented that workers will make pay 
comparisons regardless of management's attempt to keep pay 
strategies secret. He added, if the discrepancies are 
judged as inequitable, employees will express their 
dissatisfaction. Although pay secrecy, as the policy 
applies to education, is not currently a serious problem 
since pay scales and benefits costs are known by employees, 
should the school district decide to implement merit-pay 
programming, the temptation not to make awards public 
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becomes a possibility. There are two principal reasons 
underlying the failure of an organization not to make 
merit-pay increments public. First, adequate funds may not 
be available to support merit-pay programs that would 
distribute merit-pay increments to all deserving teachers 
and thereby necessitate the establishment of some form of 
quota system. Caution must be taken under these circum-
stances lest the employees attack the merit-pay program as 
being political and laden with favoritism. Should the 
merit-pay program be criticized on these grounds, justi-
fiable or not, the link between pay and performance will be 
broken, rendering the merit-pay program ineffective. 
Second, management may wish to use merit-pay increments 
as a mechanism by which coercive pressure is applied to 
keep their employees in line or to maintain their position 
of authority in the organization. With regards to this 
point English and Marchione (1983) have contended that many 
managers still believe that the road to productivity is to 
stand over the worker with a club. In effect, merit pay 
serves as that club when used coercively. 
Brunker (1982) has suggested that there are two ways 
of matching organizations and pay systems. Management can: 
a) fit the plan to the organization; or b) change the 
organization to fit the plan. In either case. the plan 
selected provides an opportunity to initiate participative 
management. Thus, Brunker added, this encourages widespread 
participation in job evaluation and provides opportunities 
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for participative performance appraisal (Lawler, 1971). 
Within the participative management structure, the following 
conditions outlined by Belcher with regards to incentive 
plans can be met. These are: 
1. employees must [will] believe that good 
performance will lead to more pay. 
2. employees must [will] believe that good 
performance will not lead to negative 
consequences. 
3. employees must [will] believe that their 
efforts lead to improved performance. (p. 347) 
Belcher (1974) has also emphasized that as employees 
receive more information on decisions, they are more likely 
to trust management and.believe that performance--reward 
relationships exist even if evidence is not unequivocal. 
In contrast, Belcher concluded: 
Unless employees in such organizations [authori-
tarian] can actually see pay-performance 
relationships, they are unlikely to believe they 
exist. (p. 452) 
In conjunction with Belcher's position, Lawler (1971) added, 
the difficulty encountered by traditional management schemes 
is that these organizations, in the absence of employee 
trust, must install more "objectively" based plans and 
establish hard criteria for measuring performance in order 
to assure that pay will act as an incentive. 
McGarrah (1983) argued that work life has declined 
because fewer Americans are participating in the planning 
and control of changes in the work process. He further 
contended: a) workers are rarely consulted; b) unions have 
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resisted efforts to enlist worker participation in planning 
job improvements; and c) managers perceive worker partici-
pation as a threat to management prerogatives. In place of 
participative management, a common reaction is to attack 
productivity with increased pressures and threats on their 
employees, by passing the real causes for productivity-
declines (English and Marchione, 1983). These writers 
added, productivity is not often thought of as a managerial 
output. Rather, the blame is shifted to anything or anyone 
but management itself. They concluded management's only 
acknowledgement of their responsibility to productivity 
management is when the organization's goals and objectives 
are met. Despite the excuses given by management for the 
organization's failure to be productive, Shetty (1982) 
emphasized that it is the manager--not government nor their 
resources (including employees) that make an organization 
productive. Ultimately, he added, productivity is the 
responsibility of the manager, and according to English and 
Marchione (1983) is to be achieved by management manipula-
tion of those variables that will unlock the latent 
abilities of the employee based on mutual respect and 
interdependence of interests. Kent and Otte (1982) have 
made an important point regarding the necessity of involving 
employees in the decision-making process involving the 
organization. First, they contend that much to the chagrin 
of management, many people are finding more self actuali-
zation off the job than on the job. Second, in order to 
gain employee loyalty to the organization and dedication 
to high production, organizations must meet various and 
frequently changing needs. Consequently, Kent and Otte 
(1982) concluded, by rewarding employees with the things 
they value, management will gain productivity and commit-
ment to the organization. 
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Kippleman and Reinharth (1982) pointed out that 
organizations frequently claim to employ merit-reward 
systems. But as these writers and Sibson (1981) and 
Anthony (1981) have added, merit-pay increases are often-
times granted for something other than improved performance. 
Freedman, Montaire, and Keller (1982) stressed that if the 
compensation system rewards only for loyalty and passive 
acceptance of existing procedures, the likelihood of 
increased performance is not promoted. Weiner (1982) 
added, as a consequence of rewarding for attributes other 
than performance, some organizations may have concluded 
that their supervisors are unable or unwilling to implement 
a true merit system. 
Managerial commitment to their merit-pay system is 
critical to the program's success. Without a clear ~nder­
standing of the processes related to the distribution of 
merit-pay increments and the determination of "merit," the 
merit-pay program's effectiveness becomes questionable. 
Consequently, the success of an incentive system (merit pay) 
depends on the following: 
1. Management must be committed to spend the time 
and effort necessary to maintain an incentive 
plan efficiently. 
2. All incentive programs require predetermined 
standards whose degree of accuracy determines 
the plan's success in qearing pay directly to 
production. 
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3. Under an incentive plan workers can be motivated 
either to increase output or reduce standards. 
The system of setting standards is, therefore 
critical. (Sibson, 1981, p. 165) 
Incentive plans require constant maintenance because of 
variations that occur as a result of doing business, and as 
a result of human variation. With regards to this point, 
Belcher (1974) added, more incentive plans fail due to 
inadequate maintenance than for any other cause. 
Complex merit-pay plans are counter-productive and 
trequently defeat their intended purpose--to improve 
performance. Belcher (1974), Newman and Logan (1974), and 
Lawler (1971) stressed the importance of keeping merit-pay 
programs simple and understandable. With respect to this 
point, Lawler (1974) emphasized, "the actual policies and 
procedures are often so complex that they mystify and 
obfuscate" (p. 84). Belcher (1974) stressed that simpli-
city and avoidance of complicated formulas is necessary to 
maintain employee trust through employee understanding of 
how the plan works and affects their pay. 
Establishing a participative management program 
serves to: a) encourage inputs from employees with regards 
to the standards to be established; b) the rates to be 
utilized; and c) determining eligibility for merit 
increments. Belcher has commented on these issues as 
follows. First, he contended that employees be encouraged 
to use grievance procedures when there is a question about 
any part of the operation of the incentive plan. Second, 
standards must be accepted by employees and guaranteed 
against any change except on agreed-on changes. Third, a 
base rate should be established for each job on incentive 
and this rate should be guaranteed regardless of the 
production of the workers. In addition, the plan is not a 
scheme to be used to avoid justifiable increases in base 
rate. 
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Although not specifically discussed by those writers 
reviewed as a problem with merit-pay programs, the question 
of quotas is brought up by teachers within education. 
Success of the merit~pay program depends on the eligibility 
of the organization's members to receive merit-pay 
increments. Given the premise that merit-pay plans are 
installed to reward performance and not reward incompetence, 
the cut-off point is to be determined relative to the 
employee's performance or lack of performance. In addition, 
another consideration that affects the decision to establish 
quotas is the degree of participation the employee has with 
regards to the design of the plan. If trust in the manage-
ment procedures is a key factor in the acceptance of merit-
pay programming, then management must assure that the plan 
does not make incentive payments without corresponding 
increases in performance (Belcher, 1974). On the other 
hand, management, in order to assure cooperation from the 
53 
employees, mu~t provide merit-pay benefits restricted only 
by the failure to perform to standard. Belcher (1974) 
pointed out that with reasonable effort workers should be 
able to attain some incentive earnings. Consequently, the 
establishment of quotas, without regards to the performance 
standards established in a participative management setting, 
would undermine the intent of merit-pay programming. 
Summary 
Five dimensions were identified and the issues 
relevant to each dimension were discussed in this chapter. 
Those factors leading to the initial acceptance or rejection 
of the merit-pay concept were presented as well as the 
psychological determinants influencing improved teacher 
performance, evaluation considerations, alternative 
strategies to be used for the improvement of incompetent 
teacher performance, and the administrative responsibilities 
related to successful·merit pay implementation. 
Chapter 3 describes the procedures used to identify 
the differences among parents, teachers, principals, 
superintendents, and school board members rega~ding issues 
relevant to successful merit pay implementation. 
Chapter 3 
Method of the Study 
Merit pay effectiveness is likely to be governed by 
the degree of congruence between the perceptions held by 
parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and school 
board members with regards to what would occur in the school 
districts relative to issues important to merit pay imple-
mentation. In order to identify and evaluate the perceptual 
differences that may exist among the school district 
constituents, the procedures of the study are discussed 
under the following headings. They are 1) Sample; 2) 
Research Methodology; 3) Instrument; and 4) Data Analysis. 
Sample 
The participants for the study were .parents, 
teachers, principals, superintendents, and school board 
members drawn from California school districts residing in 
16 of 18 regions designated by the Association of California 
School Administrators (ASCA Members Handbook, 1983-1984). 
The criteria for selecting school districts was that each 
region had elementary, high school, and unified school 
districts within regional boYndaries, and the administra-
tors of the school districts selected were Superintendents. 
Two regions were omitted from the study because they did not 
meet the elementary, high school, and unified school 
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district requirements. Region 6 did not have high school 
districts and region 16 made up the Los Angles Unified 
School District. See Appendix III. 
Research Methodology 
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Ninety-six California school districts were 
initially drawn from 16 of 18 regional lists provided by the 
Association of California School Administrators. Stratified 
sampling procedures (Ferguson, 1981) and tables of random 
numbers (Edwards, 1960) were used to select the school 
districts according to school district type--elementary, 
high school, and unified school dist~icts. 
Within each school district a parent, teacher, 
principal, superintendent, and school board member was 
selected to participate in the study. Random numbers were 
computer generated for each group--parents, teachers, and 
school board member respondents--and assigned to the 
participants for the purpose of establishing a selection 
criteria to be used by the Superintendents. For ease of 
distribution, an option was given allowing the teacher to 
be selected from the Principal's school site. The parent, 
regardless of the option excercised, was selected from the 
student list of the participating teacher. The principals 
were selected from school district directories listed in the 
1984 California Public School Directory prior to the 
distribution of the survey instrument. Each principal, in 
school districts having more than one principal, was either 
randomly selected by random number from those districts 
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having more than five principals; or by numerical sequence 
for those school districts having five or fewer principals. 
The selection of the superintendents for each school 
district corresponded with the selection of school districts 
as described above. 
A query letter was mailed to the superintendents of 
each school district selected for the study. The letter 
contained a brief introduction to the study, the sample 
required, and a request for their participation in the 
study. See Appendix I. A self-addressed, postage-paid 
response card was included with the query letter. Pro-
visions were made for the superintendents to indicate on 
the response card their willingness to participate in the 
study and make comments. See Appendix I. 
Upon receipt of the ~esponse card one of the 
folldwing occured: 1) When a response was received 
indicating that the superintendent did not wish to partici-
pate in the study, a substitute school district was selected 
using the selection procedures outline above. 2) Whenever 
the superintendents expressed a willingness to participate 
in the study, a packet was immediately mailed. 
Each packet distributed to the superintendents 
contained: a) a letter identifying the study; b) the 
respondents to be selected; c) selection and distribution 
procedures; d) provisions for recording the respondents 
should a follow-up for nonresponse be required; and d) a 
reaffirmation that.the results of the study would be 
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provided upon completion of the data analysis. See Appendix 
I. Accompanying each survey instrument was a letter 
describing the study, its importance, a request for prompt 
return of the completed instrument, and an assurance of 
confidentiality, and a self-addressed, postage-paid 
envelope. See Appendix I. 
Following an interval of three weeks from the date 
the packet was mailed follow-ups were made. An initial 
telephone call was made to the superintendents of school 
districts from which no responses were received. When a 
telephone contact was not able to be made, a letter was 
mailed expressing the importance of their participation and 
the urgency of the district's response. See Appendix .I. 
In the event one or more respondents did not return 
a survey instrument, a second packet was sent to the school 
district. This packet contained a letter identifying those 
respondents who had not returned a questionnaire as well as 
those who did respond. A second questionnaire was provided 
in case the original survey was misplaced. Instructions 
were provided for the selection of an alternate respondent 
should the first respondent not wish to participate. See 
Appendix I. 
Instrument 
In the absence of an instrument to meet the 
objectives of the study a survey instrument was constructed. 
The survey instrument consisted of 49 items (statements) 
written to elicit the repondents' attitudes with regards to 
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what would occur in the school districts relative to issues 
important to merit pay implementation. Each item 
represented a question directly addressed in the review of 
the literature or related to an issue discussed. The items 
were categorized according to five dimensions. The 
dimensions included: 1) Motivational Factors Influencing 
Decisions to Implement Merit-Pay Programs in the s~hools; 
2) Psychological Determinants Influencing Improved Teacher 
Performance; 3) Evaluation Criteria to be Employed for the 
Measurement of Teacher Performance Relating to Merit-pay 
Awards; 4) Alternative Financial Strategies Related to the 
Improvement of Functionally Incompetent Teachers; and 5) 
School Administrative Responsibilities Related to Merit Pay 
Implementation. Four additional questions were included on 
the survey instrument. Que~tion 1 determined how 
respondents defined merit pay. Question 2 determined how 
the respondents perceived the effects merit pay implementa-
tion would have on interpersonal relations in the schools. 
Questions 3 and 4 referred to the respondents' sex and age. 
See Appendix II. 
Likert Scale procedures were used to evaluate the 
responses made by the respondents. In lieu of the 
conventional Likert Scale responses, the range of responses 
were numerical in value, i.e., 3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, -3, where 
the positive signed values represent "agreement", negative 
signed values represent "disagreement", and 0 (zero) is 
"not sure." Thirty items required a positive response 
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(agree) in order to be a positively valenced attribute 
favorable to merit-pay programming. These items were: I-2, 
I-4, I-5, I-6, II-2, II-3, II-5, II-6, II-7, II-8, II-9, 
III-1, III-3, III-4, III-5, III-8, III-9, III-10, III-11, 
III-12, IV-5, IV-6, IV-7, IV-8, V-1, V-2, V-4, V-5, V-6, and 
V-7. The remaining 19 items required a negative response 
(disagree) in order to be a positively valenced attribute 
favorable to merit-pay programming. Each of the responses 
were weighted as follows: Positively valenced responses 
(agree) were weighted 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 relative to 
3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, and -3 responses. Positively valenced 
responses (disagree) were weighted 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 
relative to the 3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, and -3 responses. 
Twenty respondents, 10 parents and 10 teachers, 
participated in the pretesting of the survey instrument. 
The survey instrument was checked for clarity of instruc-
tions, clarity of statements, instrument format and time 
required to complete the survey. The respondents responded 
to the survey instrument under the same conditions as 
established for the formal study. In addition, the 
respondents identified those items that were not clearly 
written and evaluated the instrument's format. Items were 
rewritten and resubmitted to the respondents for reevalua-
tion if fifty percent or more of the respondents were 
uncertain about an item's meaning. An assessment of the 
item response variation was made to determine if items were 
to be rewritten or excluded. In addition to the preliminary 
administration of the survey instrument, three superinten-
dents, three principals, and two managers from the private 
sector evaluated the survey instrument in terms of content 
and relevance to merit pay prior to the final revision of 
the instrument. 
Two reliability coefficients were obtained. They 
are: 1) Coefficients of Stability and 2) Coefficients of 
~nternal Consistency. Kuder Richardson's KR 20 was used to 
determine the internal consistency of items for each 
dimension by group. For the purposes of obtaining the 
coefficients of internal consistency, the responses were 
treated as dichotomous data. 
Coefficients of Stability. Two groups were 
selected for the determination of stability coefficients. 
The stability coefficients for parents by dimension are: 
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a) Dimension I, .70; b) Dimension II, .67; c) Dimension III, 
.52; d) Dimension IV, .01; and e) Dimension V, .54. The 
coefficients of stability for teachers are: a) Dimension I, 
.65; b) Dimension II, .58; c) Dimension III, .79; d) 
Dimension IV, .64; and e) Dimension V, .95. 
Coefficients of Internal Consistency. The 
coefficients obtained for parents are: a) Dimension I, .81; 
Dimension II, .29; c) Dimension III, .51; d) Dimension IV, 
-.15; and e) Dimension V, .73. For teachers the coeffi-
cients obtained are: a) Dimension I, .69; b) Dimension II, 
.03; c) Dimension III, .51; d) Dimension IV, .14; and e) 
Dimension V, .81. Coefficients for principals are: 
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a) Dimension I, .90; b) Dimension II, .32; c) Dimension III, 
.32; d) Dimension IV, .35; and e) Dimension V, .48. For 
superintendents the coefficients obtained are: a) Dimension 
I, .66; b) Dimension II, -.38; c) Dimension III, .02; d) 
Dimension IV, .07; and e) Dimension V, .72. The coeffi-
cients obtained for school board members are: a) Dimension 
I, .86; b) Dimension II, -.14; c) Dimension III, .28; d) 
Dimension IV, .22; and e) Dimension v, .84. 
Data Analysis 
Analyses of variance were conducted using the 
computational procedures described by Winer (1962). The 
purpose of these analyses were to determine if differences 
existed between: a) groups by dimension and b) dimensions 
within groups. In addition to the analyses of variance, 
Fisher's Least Significant Differences procedures were used 
to determine which group means or dimension means differed 
when the analysis of variance rejected the null hypotheses. 
Five single factor (1 X 5) analyses of variance were 
carried out to determine if differences existed among the 
respondent classifications for each dimension. The 
hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 11 : There are no differences among 
parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and 
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would 
occur in the schools relative to the motivational factors 
influencing decisions to implement merit-pay programs in 
the schools. 
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Hypothesis 1 2 : There are no differences among 
parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and 
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would 
occur in the school relative to the psycholgical 
determinants influencing improved teacher performance. 
Hypothesis 1 3 : There are no differences among 
parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and 
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would 
occur in the schools relative to the evaluation criteria to 
be employed for the measurement of teacher performance 
related to merit-pay awards. 
Hypothesis 1 4 : There are no differences among 
parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and 
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would 
occur in the schools relative to the alternative financial 
strategies related to the improvement of functionally 
incompetent teachers. 
Hypothesis 1 5 : There are no differences among 
parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and 
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would 
occur in the schools relative to the school administrative 
responsibilities related to merit pay implementation. 
Five single factor (1 X 5), repeated measures, 
analyses of variance were carried out to determine if 
differences existed among the dimension responses within 
each respondent classification. The dimensions are: a) 
motivational factors influencing decisions to implement 
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merit-pay programs in the schools; b) psychological deter-
minants influencing improved teacher performance; c) 
evaluation criteria to be employed for the measurement of 
teacher performance relating to merit-pay awards~ d) 
alternative financial strategies related to the improvement 
of functionally incompetent teachers; and e) school adminis-
trative responsibilities related to merit pay 
implementation. The hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 21 : there are no differences among the 
dimensions listed above with regards to the parents' 
perceptions about what would occur in the schools relative 
to each dimension. 
Hypothesis 22 : There are no differences among the 
dimensions listed above with regards to the teachers' 
perceptions about what would occur in the schools relative 
to each dimension. 
Hypothesis 23 : There are no differences among the 
dimensions listed above with regards to the principals' 
perceptions about what would occur in the schools relative 
to each dimension. 
Hypothesis 2 4 : There are no differences among the 
dimensions listed above with regards to the superinten-
dents' perceptions about what would occur in the schools 
relative to each dimension. 
Hyp_othesis 2 5 : There are no differences among the 
dimensions listed above with regards to the school board 
members' perceptions about what would occur in the schools 
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relative to each dimension. 
Additional analyses were carried out which consisted 
of: a) an analysis of individual items and b) supplementary 
data analyses. The analyses of individual items were 
reported in terms of group means and standard deviations, 
and proportion of favorable responses by group. Included in 
the supplementary analyses were: a) group responses rela-
tive to the respondents' definition of merit pay; b) group 
responses relative to the respondents' perceptions regarding 
the effect merit pay implementation would have on inter-
personal relations in the schools; c) group responses 
relative to the respondents' sex and age. 
Summary 
A description of the population, the method of the 
study, development of the instrument, procedures of the 
study, and the methods for data analysis have been provided 
in this chapter. Chapter 4 presents the results of the 
study and interpretation of the results. 
Chapter 4 
RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
Five groups, namely: parents, teachers, principals, 
superintendents, and school board members, were selected for 
the determination of differences between groups, with 
regards to what would happen in the schools, relative to 
issues important to merit pay implementation. The issues 
identified for the study are categorized according to five 
dimensions. The dimensions are: 1) Motivational Factors 
Influencing Decisions to Implement Merit-pay Programs in the 
Schools; 2) Psychological Determinants Influencing Improved 
Teacher Performance; 3) Evaluation Criteria to be Employed 
for the Measurement of Teacher Performance; 4) Alternative 
Financial Strategies Related to the Improvement of 
Functionaily Incompetent Teachers; and 5) School Adminis-
trative Responsibilities Related to Merit Pay Implementa-
tion. See Table 12, page 94 for a description of the items 
included in each of the above categories. 
The data analysis is divided into four parts, 
namely: 1) Group Differences Within Dimensions; 2) 
Dimension Differences Within Groups; 3) Individual Item 
Analysis; and 4) Supplementary Analyses. 
Group Differences Within Dimensions 
In order to obtain maximum effectiveness, the 
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merit-pay programs selected by school districts should be 
implemented in a school environment where agreement among 
the school district's constituents is favorable to merit 
pay. Five dimensions were analyzed in order to determine 
if differences existed between groups, and to identify 
those groups in which differences occurred. 
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Five single factor (1 X 5) analyses of variance were 
carried out in order to test the hypotheses that there are 
no differences between groups within each dimensionsion. In 
addition, Fisher's Least Significant Differences procedures, 
for unequal sample sizes, were used to identify differences 
between group means within each dimension for those cases 
in which the hypotheses were rejected. The .05 level of 
significance was used to test the following hypotheses. 
Dimension I. Motivational Factors Influencing 
Decisions to Implement Merit-pay Programs in the Schools. 
The purpose for implementing merit-pay programs in the 
school is to benefit the members of the school community 
by improving the school district's productivity, which, in 
turn results in increased financial benefit to the teachers 
relative to improved performance. 
Hypothesis Hl 1 : there are no differences among 
parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and 
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would 
occur in the schools relative to the motivational factors 
influencing decisions to implement merit-pay programs in 
the schools, is rejected at the .05 level of significance; 
Fobs.= 7.68, . 95 F (4 , 151 ) = 2.43. See Table 1.1, page 67 
for the analysis of variance summary. 
Differences were found between groups which are 
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limited to differences between teachers and parents, princi-
pals, superintendents, and school board members. The 
differences between group means indicate that teachers' 
responses are less favorable to merit pay implementation in 
regards to the motivational factors influencing decisions 
to implement merit pay in the schools than are the responses 
of parents, principals, superintendents, and school board 
members. Teachers fail to accept the hypothesis that merit 
pay will improve educational productivity or benefit members 
of the school community. However, parents, principals, 
superintendents, and school board members accept the 
hypothesis. See Table 1.4, page 68 for the summary of 
differences between groups. Table 1.2, page 68 provides a 
summary of item and dimension means. 
Table 1 
Dimension I Summary Tables for the Analysis of Variance, 
Item Means, Proportion of Responses Favorable 
to Merit Pay, and Differences Between Means 
Table 1.1. Analysis of Variance Summary: Motivational Factors 
Influencing Decisions to Implement Merit-pay Programs 
Source of Variation ss df MS F 
- - - -
-
Between Groups 52.41 4 15.10 7.68* 
Within Groups 250.92 151 
Total 303.33 155 
*.95 F (4, 151) = 2"43 
Table 1.2. Item Means: Motivational Factors Influencing Decisions to 
Implement Merit-pay Programs In the Schools 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 T 
Parents 5.00 5.48 5.43 5.74 5.00 5.09 3.83 3.56 4.87 
Teachers 2.87 4.07 3.53 3.83· 3.30 3.43 2.67 2.30 3.22 
Principals 3.91 5.06 5.30 5.27 4.52 4.52 3.94 2.94 4.46 
Superintendents 4.23 4.77 5.51 5.33 4.16 4.52 4.70 3.26 4.62 
School Board Members 4.03 5.48 5.56 5.00 4.37 4.46 4.48 3.55 4.62 
Table 1.3. Proportion of Responses Favorable to Merit Pay: Motivational 
Factors Influencing Decisions to Implement Merit Pay in the Schools 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 T 
Parents .65 .83 .78 .87 .65 .65 .30 .35 .64 
Teachers .20 .47 .43 .43 .20 .37 .10 .13 .29 
Principals .45 .67 .80 .77 .60 .63 .50 .20 .58 
Superintendents .47 .63 .74 .72 .35 .56 .53 .28 .54 
School Board Members .48 .81 .78 .70 .59 .63 .63 .33 .62 
Table 1.4. Differences Between Group Means Using Fisher's Critical~ 
Method: Motivational Factors Influencing Decsions to 
Implement Merit-pay Programs in the Schools 
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Parents Teachers Principals Superintendents 
School Board 
Members 
Parents 
Teachers 
Principals 
Super (ntendents 
School Board 
Members 
*.95 t 151 = 1"65 
4.62* 
1.17 
.75 
.16 
3.82* 
4.57* 
4.61* 
.54 
1.06 .59 
Dimension II. Psychological Determinants Influencing 
Improved Teacher Performance. 
Hypothesis Hl 2 : there are no differences between 
parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and 
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would 
occur in the schools relative to the pyschological determi-
nants influencing improved teacher performance, is rejected 
at the . 05 level of significance; F b = 8. 48, 
. -0 s. 
_95 F (4 , 151 ) = 2.43. See Table 2.1, page 69 for the 
analysis of variance summary. 
Differences.between groups were identified. The 
differences between group means indicate that the princi-
pals' responses are more favorable to merit pay regarding 
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the psychological determinants influencing improved teacher 
performance than are parents, teachers, superintendents, 
and school board members. In addition, teachers' responses 
are less favorable to merit pay than are the responses of 
parents, principals, superintendents, and school board 
members. See Table 2.4, page 69 for the summary of 
differences between groups. Table 2.2, page 69 provides a 
summary of item and dimension means. 
Table 2 
Dimension II Summary Tables for the Analysis of Variance, 
Item Means, Proportion of Responses Favorable 
to Merit Pay, and Differences Between Means 
Table 2.1. Anarysis of Variance Summary: Pyschological Determinants 
Influencing Improved Teacher Performance 
Source of Variation ss df MS F 
- - -
-
Between Groups 8.43 4 2.10 8.48* 
Within Groups 37.51 151 
Total 45.94 155 
* F = 2.43 
.95 (4, 151) 
Table 2.2. Item Means: Psychological Determinants Influencing 
Improved Teacher Performance 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Parents 4.48 4.30 3.04 4.30 3.21 3.87 5.61 5.00 4.13 3.87 
Teachers 4.60 4.49 3.97 3.81 3.53 3.60 5.90 3.73 3.13 2.53 
Principals 5.06 4.52 2.61 4.48 4.00 4.12 5.36 5.73 5.33 4.88 
Superintendents 5.13 4.28 2.63 4.53 3.40 4.16 5.67 4.83 5.47 5.16 
School Board Members 4.65 3.88 2.24 4.42 4.15 4.54 5.54 5.38 4. 73 3.92 
Table 2.3. Proportion of Responses Favorable to Merit Pay: Psychological 
Determinants Influencing Improved Teacher Performance 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Parents .56 .43 .26 .57 .26 .30 .74 .57 .39 .39 
Teachers .63 .53 .40 .37 .33 .27 .90 .33 .20 .19 
Principals .67 .51 .12 .55 .48 .33 .73 .85 .70 .67 
Superintendents .79 .56 .07 .58 .30 .47 .84 .63 .40 .74 
School Board Members .65 .38 .08 .54 .50 .50 .73 .73 .54 .46 
Table 2.4. Differences Between Group Means Using Fisher's Critical t 
Method: Psychological Determinants Influencing 
Improved Teacher Performance 
T 
.45 
.42 
.56 
.54 
.51 
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T 
4.25 
3.92 
4.62 
4.39 
4.33 
Parents Teachers Principals Superintendents 
School Board 
Members 
Parents 
Teachers 
Principals 
Superintendents 
School Board 
Members 
* t = 1 .65 
.95 151 
2.38* 
2. 72* 
.85 
.56 
Dimension III. 
5.55* 
3.70* 
3.06* 
2.25* 
2.21* .24 
Evaluation Criteria to be Employed 
for the Measurement of Teacher Performance Relating to 
Merit-pay Awards. 
Hypothesis Hl 3 : there are no differences between 
parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and 
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would 
occur in the schools relative to the evaluation criteria 
to be employed for the measurement of teacher performance 
relating to merit-pay awards, is not rejected at the .05 
level of significance; f.obs. = .56, _95 F ( 4 , lSl) = 2.43. 
See Table 3.1 for the analysis of variance summary. 
No differences were found between group means. As 
a result, it can not be concluded that the responses 
provided by the parents, teachers, principals, superinten-
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dents, and school board members reflect different attitudes 
with regards to the evaluation criteria to be employed for 
the measurement of teacher performance relating to merit-pay 
awards. However, there is variation between the individual 
item means which are discussed in the Analysis of Individual 
Items section. See Table 3.2, page 71 for a summary of 
item and dimension means. 
Table 3 
Dimension III Summary Tables for the Analysis of Variance, 
Item Means, and Proportion of Responses Favorable 
to Merit Pay 
Table 3.1. Analysis of Variance Summary: Evaluation Criteria to 
be Employed for the Measurement of Teacher Performance 
Relating to Merit-pay Awards 
Source of Variation ss df MS F 
- - - -
Between Groups. .93 4 .23 .56* 
Within Groups 62.04 i51 .41 
Total 62.97 155 
*.95F (4, 151 l = 2' 43 
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Table 3.2. Item Means: Evaluation Criteria to be Employed for 
the Measurement of Teacher Performance 
Relating to Merit-pay Awards 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 T 
Parents 5.70 3.00 4.35 5.35 3.83 5.87 4.83 4.34 4.30 4.26 2.70 3.91 5.87 4.53 
Teachers 6.10 3.93 3.87 3.87 4.60 5.73 5.47 3.43 2.83 4.07 3.57 3.20 5.40 4.30 
Principals 5.82 3.42 4.94 5.18 4.36 5.30 3.94 4.73 2.73 2.70 3.39 4.73 6.03 4.35 
Superintendents 5.53 3.47 4.23 4.70 4.60 4.63 3.63 5.02 2.56 3.23 3.58 5.35 5.91 4.36 
School Board Members 5.81 3.62 4.50 4.58 3.65 4.88 3.88 4.62 3.27 3.04 3.27 4.68 5.88 4.28 
Table 3.3. Proportion of Responses Favorable to Merit Pay: Evaluation Criteria 
to be Employed for the Measurement of Teacher Performance 
Relating to Merit-Pay Awards 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 T 
Parents • 74 .26 .48 .74 .48 .78 .61 .61 .43 .43 .13 .43 .91 .54 
Teachers .83 .43 .47 .37 .67 .77 .70 .33 .17 .40 .33 .27 .87 .51 
Principals .85 .32 .62 .65 .59 .68 .47 .62 • 21 .15 .26 .68 .91 .54 
Superintendents .81 .42 .56 .65 .60 .60 .42 .72 .19 .30 .30 • 79 .91 .56 
School Board Members .81 .42 .58 .62 .46 .69 .50 .73 .23 .23 .19 .65 .85 .54 
Dimension IV. Alternative Financial Strategies 
Related to the Improvement of Functionally Incompetent 
Teachers. 
Hypothesis Hl 4 : there are no differences between 
parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and 
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would 
occur in the schools relative to the financial strategies 
related to the improvement of functionally incompetent 
teachers is not rejected at the .05 level of significance; 
fobs.= 1.65, _95 F( 4 , 151 ) = 2.43. See Table 4.1, page 73 
for the analysis of variance summary. 
No differences were found between group means. 
Therefore, it can not be concluded that the responses 
provided by the parents, teachers, principals, superinten-
dents, and school board members have different opinions 
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regarding the alternative fin~ncial strategies related to 
the improvement of functionally incompetent teachers. See 
Table 4.2, page 73 for a summary of the Dimension IV item 
and dimension means. 
Table 4 
Dimension IV Summary Tables for the Analysis of Variance, 
Item Means, and Proportion of Responses Favorable 
to Merit Pay 
Table 4.1. Analysis of Variance Summary: Alternative Financial 
Related to the Improvement of Functionally 
Incompetent Teachers 
Source of Variation ss df MS F 
- - - -
Between Groups 2.25 4 .56 1.65* 
Within Groups 51.48 151 .34 
Total 53.65 155 
* F 2.43 
.95 (4, 151) 
Table 4.2. Item Means: Alternative Financial Strategies 
Related to the Improvement of Functionally 
Incompetent Teachers 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Parents 4.96 3.74 4.08 2.70 4.13 5.26 5.61 4.09 
Teachers 5.20 5.13 4.70 5.03 4.20 5.00 4.63 3.37 
Principals 4.94 4.42 5.30 2.82 4.76 5.40 5.48 3.61 
Superintendents 4.88 4.79 4. 77 2.51 4.12 4.88 4.63 4.07 
School Board Members 5.11 4.04 4.00 2.69 5.19 5.23 5.69 3.35 
T 
4.38 
4.64 
4.58 
4.34 
4.44 
Table 4.3. Proportion of Responses Favorable to Merit Pay: Alternative 
Financial Strategies Related to the Improvement 
of Functionally Incompetent Teachers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 T 
Parents .57 .26 .39 .13 .78 • 78 .74 .43 .51 
Teachers .67 .60 .60 .67 .40 .70 .57 .30 .56 
Principals .56 .44 .56 .24 .62 .79 .82 .32 .54 
Superintendents .60 .60 .58 .16 .53 .81 .58 .37 .53 
School Board Members .69 .31 .31 .12 .56 .85 .81 .19 .48 
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Dimension V. School Administrative Responsibilities 
Related to Merit Pay Implementation. 
Hypothesis Hl 5 : there are no differences between 
parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and 
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would 
occur in the schools relative to the school administrative 
responsibilities related to merit pay implementation, is 
not rejected at the .05 level of significance; F b = 1.43, 
-0 s . 
. 95F (4 , 151 ) = 2.43. See Table 5.1, page 74 for the 
analysis of variance summary. 
No. differences were found between group means. As a 
result, it can not be concluded that the responses provided 
by parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and 
school board members reflect differences of opinion 
regarding the school administrative responsibilities related 
to merit pay implementation. See Table 5.2, page 75 for a 
summary of item and dimension means. 
Table 5 
Dimension V Summary Tables for the Analysis of Variance, 
Item Means, and Proportion of Responses Favorable 
to Merit Pay 
Table 5.1. Analysis of Variance Summary: School Administrative 
Responsuibilities Related to Merit Pay Implementation 
Source of Variation ss df MS F 
- - - -
Between Groups 4.97 4 1.24 1.43* 
Within Groups 130.79 151 .87 
Total 135.76 155 
* F = 2.43 
.95 (4, 151) 
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Table 5.2. Item Means: School Administrative Responsibilities 
Related to Merit Pay Implementation 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 T 
Parents 5.52 5.74 4.52 3.22 5.61 5.91 6.00 5.52 3.89 3.95 4.96 
Teachers 4.67 5~27 4.83 3.86 5.53 4.90 4.57 4.93 4.80 4;40 4. 76 
Principals 5.48 6;33 4.91 3.41 5.76 6.12 6.24. 5.29 4.91 4.55 5.31 
Superintendents 5.37 5.70 4.88 3.67 5.35 5.70 6.02 5.51 4.86 4.41 5.15 
School Board Members 5.81 5.92 4.23 4.19 5.26 5. 77 6.31 5.11 4.59 4.42 5.13 
Table 5.3. Proportion of Responses Favorable to Merit Pay: School 
Administrative Responsibilities Related 
to Merit Pay Implementation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 F 
Parents .83 .87 .48 .17 .83 .83 .87 .78 .26 .48 .64 
Teachers .57 .73 .57 ;37 .77 .63 .53 .57 .53 .47 .57 
Principals .85 .94 .53 .35 .91 .91 .91 .68 .62 .53 .72 
Superintendents .77 .86 .63 .33 ;74 .86 .91 .84 .60 .42 .64 
School Board Members .92 .92 .42 .50 .85 .85 .92 .62 .46 .46 .69 
Summary. The contention that there are no differ-
ences between parents, teachers, principals, superinten-
dents, and school board members is not confirmed for those 
dimensions relating to: a) motivational factors influencing 
decisions to implement merit-pay programs in the schools; 
and b) psychological determinants influencing improved 
teacher performance. For: a) evaluation criteria to be 
employed for the measurement of teacher performance related 
.to merit-pay awards; b) alternative financial strategies 
related to the improvement of functionally incompetent 
teachers; and c) school administrative responsibilities 
related to merit pay implementation, the position that there 
are no differences between parents, teachers, principals, 
superintendents, and school board members is confirmed. 
Differences between groups were identified for 
Dimension I and Dimension II. In the majority of the cases 
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where differences were noted, teachers were more frequently 
paired with other groups. 
Teachers responses were not favorable to merit pay 
implementation with regards to: motivational factors 
influencing decisions to implement merit-pay programs in the 
schools. In contrast, parents and school board members were 
more inclined to respond favorably to the above. Teachers 
were "not sure" with regards to: psychological determinants 
influencing improved teacher performance. Principals tended 
to respond favorably. Teachers and principals responded 
more favorably to: alternative financial strategies related 
to the improvement of functionally incompetent teachers than 
did parents, superintendents, and school board members. 
With respect to: school administrative responsibilities 
related to merit pay implementation, all groups provided 
favorable responses. However, teachers are not as strong in 
their conviction as are parents, principals, superinten-
dents, and school board members. 
Overall, there are no strong commitments, favorable 
or unfavorable, to merit pay implementation with the 
possible exception of: 1) Teachers rejecting the premise 
that merit pay would improve school productivity and benefit 
members of the school community. 2) Parents and school 
board members supporting the premise that school produc-
tivity would be increased and school community members will 
benefit. 3) Parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, 
and school board members supporting the position that school 
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administrators would provide administrative support facili-
tating an effective merit-pay program. 
Dimension Differences Within Groups 
Five single factor (l X 5) repeated measures 
analyses of variance were carried out to test the hypotheses 
that there are no differences between dimensions within 
groups. The groups are a) parents, b) teachers, c) princi-
pals, d) superintendents, and e) school board members. 
Differences between dimension means were determined using 
Fisher's Least Significant Differences procedures for equal 
sample sizes. The .05 level of significance was used to 
test the following hypotheses. 
Parents. Hypothesis H2 1 : there are no differences 
between dimensions within the parent group is rejected at 
the .05 level of significance; Fobs.= 2.86, _95 F( 4 , 88 )= 
2.48. See Table 6.1, page 78 for the analysis of variance 
summary. 
Differences between the dimensions within groups 
were found. These differences indicate that parents respond 
less favorably to: a) psychological determinants influ-
encing teacher performance; and b) alternative financial 
strategies related to the improvement of functionally 
incompetent teachers, than they do to motivational factors 
influencing decisions to implement merit-pay programs in the 
schools. In addition, parent responses are less favorable 
for: a) psychological determinants influencing improved 
teacher performance; and b) alternative financial strategies 
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related to the improvement of functionally incompetent 
teachers than they do for school administrative responsi-
bilities related to merit pay implementation. The strongest 
responses favorable to merit pay implementation made by 
parents were: a) motivational factors influencing decisions 
to implement merit-pay programs in the schools; and b) 
school administrative responsibilities related to merit 
pay implementation. See Table 6.2, page 78 for a summary 
of differences between dimensions. 
Table 6 
Parents Summary Tables for the Analysis of Variance, 
and Differences Between Dimensions 
Table 6.1. Parents Between Dimensions Analysis of Variance 
Source of Variation ss df MS F 
·- - - -
Between Parents 20.39 22 
Within Parents 76.62 92 
Dimensions 8.81 4 2.20 2.86* 
Residual 67.80 88 .77 
Total 97.00 114 
* F 2.48 
.95 {4, 88) 
Table 6.2. Differences Between Dimension Means Withi~ Par!:_nts Groups Using 
Fisher's.Critical Difference Method CXC- XRl 
Dimension I Dimension II Dimension Ill Dimension IV Dimension V 
Dimension I .62* 
Dimension II .34 .28 
Dimension Ill .49* .13 .15 
Dimension IV .09 .71* .43 .58* 
*Critical Difference = .44 
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Teachers. Hypothesis H2 2 : there are no differences 
between dimensions within the teacher group is rejected at 
the .05 level of significance; Fobs.= 13.71, • 95 F( 4 , 116 ) = 
2.46. See Table 7.1, page 80 for analysis of variance 
summary •. 
Critical differences were found between dimensions 
within the teachers group. The differences between 
dimension means indicate that teacher's responses are more 
favorable towards: a) psychological determinants influ-
encing improved teacher performance; b) alternative 
financial strategies related to the improvement of 
functionally incompetent teachers; c) evaluation criteria to 
be employed for the measurement of teacher performance 
related to merit-pay awards; and d) school administrative 
responsibilities related to merit pay implementation, than 
they are to motivational factors influencing decisions to 
implement merit pay programs in the schools. Teachers also 
respond more favorably to financial strategies related to 
the improvement of functionally incompetent teachers than 
to psychological determinants influencing improved teacher 
performance. In addition, teachers are more inclined to 
respond favorably to school administrative responsibilities 
related to merit pay implementation and less favorably to 
either: a) psychological determinants influencing improved 
teacher performance; and b) evaluation criteria to be 
employed for the measurement of teacher performance relating 
to merit-pay awards. See Table 7.2 for a summary of 
of differences between dimensions. 
Table 7 
Teachers Summary Tables for the Analysis of Variance, 
and Differences Between Dimensions 
Table 7.1. Teachers Between Dimensions Analysis of Variance 
Source of· Variation ss df MS F 
- - - -
Between Teachers 34.93 29 
Within Teachers 145.19 120 
Dimensions, 46.63 4 11.66 13.72* 
Residual 98.56 128 .as 
Total 180.12 149 
* F = 2.46 
.95 (4, 116) 
Table 7.2. Differences Between Dimension Means Within Teachers Group Using 
Fisher's Critical Difference Method <XC- XR> 
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Dimension I Dimension II Dimension Ill Dimension IV Dimension V 
Dimension I 
Dimension II .70* 
Dimension Ill 
Dimension IV 
Dimension V 
1.08* 
1.42* 
1.54* 
*Critical Difference= .40 
.38 
.72* 
.84* 
.34 
.46* 
Principals. Hypothesis H2 3 : 
.12 
there are no 
differences between dimensions within the principals group 
. 
is rejected at the .05 level of significance; F b = 7.39, 
-0 s . 
. 95 F ( 4 , 132 ) = 2.44. See Table 8.1, page 81 for analysis of 
variance summary. 
The differences found between dimension means indi-
cates that principals respond more favorably to: school 
administrative responsibilities related to merit pay 
implementation than they respond to: a) motivational 
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factors influencing decisions to implement merit-pay 
programs in the schools; b) evaluation criteria to be 
employed for the measurement of teacher performance relating 
to merit-pay awards; and c) alternative financial strategies 
related to the improvement of functionally incompetent 
teachers. See Table 8.2, page 81 for a summary of 
differences between dimensions. 
Table 8 
Principals Summary Tables for the Analysis of Variance, 
and Differnces Between Dimensions 
Table 8.1. Principals Between Dimensions Analysis of Variance Summary 
Source of Variation ss df MS F 
- - - -
Between Principals 17.44 32 
Within Principals 98.27 132 
Dimensions 18.43 4 4.61 7.39* 
Residual 79.84 128 .62 
Total 115.71 164 
* 9 F < 4 1 28 > = 2 • 44 • 5 , 
Table 8.2. Differences Between Dimension Means Within Principals Group Using 
Fisher's Critical Difference Method <XC- XR) 
Dimension I Dimension If Dimension Ill Dimension IV Dimension V 
Dimension I 
Dimension II 
Dimension Ill 
.16 
• 11 
Dimension IV .12 
Dimension V .85* 
- *Critical Difference= .33 
.27 
.04 
.69* 
.23 
.96* 
Superintendents. Hypothesis H2 4 : 
.73* 
there are no 
differences between dimensions within the superintendents 
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group is rejected at the .05 level of significance; 
Fobs.= 10.74, _95 F( 4 , 168 ) = 2.43. See Table 9.1, page 83 
for the analysis of variance summary. 
Differences between dimensions were found within the 
superintendents group. The differences between dimension 
means indicate that superintendents are less favorable to: 
a) evaluation criteria to be employed for the measurement of 
teacher performance relating to merit-pay awards; and b) 
alternative financial strategies related to the improvement 
of functionally incompetent teachers, than they are to 
motivational factors influencing decisions to implement 
merit-pay programs in the schools. In addition, superin-
tendents are more favorable to school administrative 
responsibilities related to merit pay implementation than 
they are to: a) motivational factors influencing decisions 
to implement merit pay programs in the schools; b) 
psychological determinants influencing improved teacher 
performance; c) evaluation criteria to be employed for the 
measurement of teacher performance relating to merit-pay 
awards; and d) alternative financial strategies related to 
the improvement of functionally incompetent teachers. See 
Table 9.2, page 83 for a summary of dimension differences. 
Table 9 
Superintendents Summary Tables for the Analysis of 
Variance, and Differences Between Dimensions 
Table 9.1. Superintendents Between Dimensions Analysis of Variance Summary 
Source of Variation ss df MS F 
- - - -
Between Superintendents 36.38 42 
Within Superintendents 99.33 172 
Dimensions 20.24 4 5.06 10.74* 
Residual 79.10 i68 .47 
Total 135.72 214 
* F = 2.43 
.95 (4, 168) 
Table 9.2. Differences Between Dimension Means Within Superintendents Group 
Using Fisher's Critical Difference Method <XC - XRl 
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Dimension I Dimension II Dimension Ill Dimension IV Dimension V 
Dimension I 
Dimension I I .23 
Dimension I I I .26* .03 
Dimension IV .28* .05 .02 
Dimension V .53* .76* • 79* .81* 
*Critical Difference= .25 
there are no School Board Members. Hypothesis H2 5 : 
differences between dimensions within the school board 
members group is rejected at the .05 level of significance; 
E:.obs. = 5.47, . 95 F( 4 , lOO) = 2.46. See Table 10.1, page 84 
for analysis of variance summary. 
Differences were found between dimension means for 
the school board members group. The differences between 
dimension means indicate that school board members are less 
favorable to: a) psychological determinants influencing 
improved teacher performance; b) alternative financial 
84 
strategies related to the improvement of incompetent 
teachers, than they are to motivational factors influencing 
decisions to implement merit-pay programs in the schools. 
School board members are more favorable to school adminis-
\ 
trative responsibilities related to merit pay implementation 
than they are to: a) motivational factors influencing 
decisions to implement merit-pay programs in the schools; 
b) psychological determinants influencing improved teacher 
performance; c) evaluation criteria to be used to measure 
teacher performance relating to merit-pay awards; and d) 
alternative financial strategies related to the improvement 
of functionally incompetent teachers. 
Table 10 
School Board Members Summary Tables for the Analysis 
Variance, and Differences Between Dimensions 
Table 10.1. School Board Members Between Dimensions Analysis of Variance Summary 
Source of Variation ss df MS F 
- - - -
Between School Board Members 28.45 25 
Within School Board Members 75.63 104 
Dimensions 13.57 4 3.39 5.47* 
Residual 62.06 100 .62 
Total 104.08 129 
* F C 1 OO) = 2. 46 .95 4, 
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Table 10.2. Differences Between Dimension Means Within School Board Members 
Group Using Fisher's Critical Difference Method CXC - XR> 
Dimension I Dimension II Dimension Ill Dimension IV Dimension V 
Dimension I 
Dimension II .48* 
Dimension Ill .53* .05 
Dimension IV .37 .11 .16 
Dimension V .32 .80* .85* .69* 
*Critical Difference = ,37 
Table 1 0.3. Groups-Dimensions Means Summary 
I II Ill IV v 
Parents 4.87 4.25 4.53 4.38 4.96 
Teachers 3.22 3.92 4.30 4.64 4.76 
Principals 4.46 4.62 4.35 4.58 5.31 
Superintendents 4.62 4.39 4.36 4.34 5.15 
School Board Members 4.81 4.33 4.28 4.44 5.13 
Summary. A number of differences were found between 
dimensions within each group. However, one pair of dimen-
sion differences are common to all groups. Parents, 
teachers, principals, superintendents, and school board 
members respond more favorably to school administrative 
responsibilities related to merit pay implementation than 
to psychological determinants influencing improved teacher 
performance. In addition, with respect to school adminis-
trative responsibilities related to merit pay implementation 
two pairs of dimension differences have been identified in 
which differences are found for four of five groups. First, 
teachers, principals, superintendents, and school board 
members respond less favorably to evaluation criteria to be 
employed for the measurement of teacher performance related 
to merit pay; and second, parents, principals, 
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superintendents, and school board members respond less 
favorably to alternative financial strategies related to the 
improvement of functionally incompetent teachers than they 
do to school administrative responsibilities related to 
merit pay implementation. See Table 10.3, page 85 for a 
summary of group-dimension means. 
Individual Item Analysis 
Group differences within dimensions and dimension 
differences within groups have analyzed and discussed above. 
Although differences were found, the differences identified 
provide only trends and general relationships between groups 
and dimensions. The following analyses examines group 
responses to item means within each dimension in terms of 
whether the responses to the items are: a) favorable to 
merit pay implementation; b) unfavorable to merit pay 
implementation; or c) "not sure." The assignment of the 
item means is based on a critical difference that estimates 
the items significant departure from the survey response 
value, 4, which represents "not sure." The decision rule 
used to determine critical differences takes into account 
the sample size and response variation. Those item means 
which exceed 4.0 + Diff, or are less than 4.0 - Diff are 
treated as favorable and unfavorable respectively, where 
Diff = _95 t(n) (s/lfi). All other item means are treated as 
"not sure." 
Dimension I. Motivational Factors Influencing 
Decisions to Implement Merit-pay Programs in the Schools. 
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Parents (6) and superintendents (5) have a greater frequency 
of responses favorable to merit pay implementation than do 
teachers, principals, and school board members with regards 
to motivational factors influencing decisions to implement 
merit-pay programs in the schools. Teachers (4) have the 
highest frequency of responses unfavorable to merit pay 
implementation. Teachers (4), principals (4), and school 
board members (4) are "not sure" on more items than parents 
(2) and superintendents (2). 
Teachers indicated uncertainty with regards to: a) 
merit pay would imp~ove educational productivity by 
motivating improved teacher performance (Item I-2) ; b) 
merit pay would exploit teachers rather than provide 
reasonable compensation for work done (Item I-3); and c) 
merit pay would benefit teachers (Item I-4). Teachers, 
believe that general salary increases would improve teacher 
performance at least as effectively as merit pay (Item I-7). 
Parents, principals, and superintendents responded favorably 
to Items I-2, I-3, and I-4, whereas parents, principals, 
and school board members are "not sure" about Item I-7, and 
superintendents disagree with teachers. 
Parents and school board members were not sure with 
regards to whether the solution of school problems unrelated 
to financial incentives would have a greater effect on the 
improvement of teacher performance than would merit pay 
implementation. Teachers, principals, and superintendents 
gave responses unfavorable (agree) to merit pay 
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implementation. See Table 11.1, page 93 and Table 12, page 
94 for a summary of favorable, unfavorable, and "not sure" 
responses for Dimension I. 
Dimension II. Psychological Determinants Influ-
encing Improved Teacher Performance. Parents (6), teachers 
(7), and school board members (5) have the highest frequency 
of "not sure" responses. Principals (7) and superintendents 
(6) have the highest frequency of responses favorable to 
merit pay implementation. 
All groups responded "not sure" to Item II-6: 
school district practices would allow school administrators 
to distribute merit-pay awards as soon as improved teacher 
performance is documented. All groups responded favorably 
(agree) to: in order to establish the relationship between 
performance and merit-pay awards, merit-pay evaluations 
would have to be conducted more frequently than once a year 
(Item II-7). Principals and superintendents respond 
favorably to: a) school administrators would have a 
functional understanding of those reinforcement theories and 
practices that relate to effective merit pay implementation 
(agree) (Item II~8); b) school administrators would be able 
to determine when nonfinancial rewards more effectively 
improve teacher performance than financial rewards (agree) 
(Item II-9); and c) school administrators seldom reward 
improved performance (disagree) (Item II-10). Teachers 
agree that school administrators seldom reward improved 
performance; parents and school board members are "not 
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sure." See Table 11.2, page 93 and Table 12, page 94 for a 
summary of favorable, unfavorable, and "not sure" responses 
for Dimension II. 
Dimension III. Evaluation Criteria to be Employed 
for the Measurement of Teacher Performance Related to merit-
pay awards. Parents (6), teachers (7), and school board 
members (5) have the highest frequency of ''not sure" 
responses. Principals (7) and superintendents (7) have the 
highest frequency of responses favorable to merit pay 
implementation. 
Favorable responses among groups are indicated for: 
a) merit-pay evaluations would relate specifically to those 
work elements the teacher has control over (Item III-1) ; 
b) merit-pay evaluations would be determined solely by 
school administrators (disagree) (Item III-6); and c) 
merit-pay awards may be made on the basis of quality as well 
as quantity (Item III-13). Parents, principals, and super-
intendents indtcate favorable responses to: merit-pay 
evaluations would be determined by teachers, school 
administrators, and parents (Item III-4). Teachers and 
school board members are ''not sure." Parents, principals, 
and school board members responded unfavorably (agree) to: 
teacher style, characteristics, and instructional method 
would be the key elements used for merit-pay evaluations 
(Item III-11) • Teachers and superintendents were "not 
sure." In contrast to Item III-11, principals, superinten-
dents, and school board members responded favorably to: 
student performance would be the key element used for the 
development of teacher performance measures relating to 
merit-pay awards (Item III-12). Teachers responded 
unfavorably (disagree) with item III-12 and parents were 
"not sure." See Table 11.3, page 93 and Table 12, page 94 
for a summary of favorable, unfavorable, and "not sure" 
responses for Dimension III. 
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Dimension IV. Alternative Financial Strategies 
Related to the Improvement of Functionally Incompetent 
Teachers. Parents (4) have the highest frequency of "not 
sure" responses. Teachers (6), principals (5), and superin-
tendents (5) have the greatest frequency of responses 
favorable to merit pay implementation. 
All groups responded favorably to: a) financial 
awards based on performance would improve the performance 
of incompetent teachers (disagree) (Item IV-1); guidance 
and supervision by effective teachers would improve the 
performance of incompetent teachers (agree) (Item IV-6); 
and c) incompetent teachers should be removed from the 
classroom and placed in teacher development programs until 
determined able to return to the_ classroom (agree) (Item 
IV-7). Teachers responded favorably (disagree) to: teacher 
competency is the most critical issue bearing on educational 
productiveness in the schools (Item IV-4). All other groups 
responded unfavorably (agree) with regards to Item IV-4. 
School board members responses are unfavorable (agree) with 
regards to: dismissal would be the only appropriate action 
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to be taken with regards to incompetent teachers. All other 
groups are not sure. See Table 11.4, page 93 and Table 12, 
page 94 for the summary of favorable, unfavorable, and 
"not sure" responses for Dimension IV. 
Dimension V. School Administrative Responsibilities 
Related to Merit Pay Implementation. Teachers (8), princi-
pals (9), and superintendents (9) have the highest frequency 
of responses favorable to merit pay implementation. School 
board members (4) have the greatest frequency of "not sure" 
responses. All group responses are favorable to: a) school 
administrators would establish policies and procedures 
simple enough for teachers to see the direct relationship 
between merit-pay increases and performance (Item V-1); 
b) school administrators would maintain lines of communi-
cations that would allow teachers to provide input about the 
reasonableness and equity of performance expectations (Item 
V-2); and c) school administrators would maintain merit-pay 
programs in which teachers contribute to the design and 
administration of the pr6gram (Item V-5); d) school 
administrators would be committed to excellence through the 
concerted effort to assure that only competent performance 
is rewarded (Item V-7); and e) school administrators would 
distribute merit-pay awards on the basis of the job require-
ments and who fills the job, rather than performance 
(disagree) (Item V-8). Principals and superintendents 
respond favorably to all items except Item V-4: school 
administrators would accept performance failures as their 
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ultimate responsibility. Principals responses are 
unfavorable (disagree) to merit pay implementation and 
superintendents are not sure. Teachers, principals, and 
superintendents respond favorably to: a) school adminis-
trators would establis'h quotas limiting the number of 
teachers that would receive merit-pay awards (disagree) and 
b) schodl administrators would attempt to modify teacher 
performance through the use of merit pay rather than 
changing rules, management practices, or the job (disagree). 
Parents and school board members are not sure with regards 
to these issues. See Table 11.5, page 94 and Table 12, page 
94 for the summary of favorable, unfavorable, and "not sure" 
responses for Dimension V. 
Summary. Across all dimensions, the total favor-
able, unfavorable, and "not sure" responses for each group 
are: a) parents (22, 6, 21); b) teachers (19, 8, 22); c) 
principals (31, 7, 11); d) superintendents (32, 7, 10); and 
e) school board members (21, 7, 21). In terms of total 
score, principals and superintendents reflect response 
patterns largely favorable to merit pay implementation. 
Teachers, parents, and school board members are less favor-
able to merit pay implementation with a high frequency of 
"not sure" responses as part of their response pattern. 
Table 11 
Summary Tables for Favorable, Unfavorable and 
Not Sure Responses for Individual Items 
Table 11 • 1 • Favorable, Unfavorable, and Not Sure Responses: 
Motivational Factors Influencing Decisions to 
Implement Merit-pay Programs In the Schools 
1 ·2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Parents F F F F F F N N 
Teachers u N N N u N u u 
Principals N F F F N N N u 
Superintendents N F F F N F F u 
School Board M~mbers N F F F N N N N 
Table 11.2. Favorable, Unfavorable, and Not Sure Responses: 
Psychological Determinants Influencing 
Improved Teacher Perforamce 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Parents N N u N u N F F N N 
Teachers N N N N N N F N u u 
Principals F F u F N N F F F F 
Superintendents F N u F u N F F F F 
School Board Members N u u N N N F F F N 
Table 11 .3. Favorable, Unfavorable, and Not Sure Responses: Evaluation 
Criteria to be Employed for the Measurement of Teacher 
Relating to Merit-pay Awards 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Parents F u N F N F F N N N u N F 
Teachers F N N N N F F N u N N u F 
Principals F N F F N F N F u u u F F 
Superintendents F u N F F F N F u u N F F 
School Board Members f' N F N N F N N u u u F F 
Table 11 .4. Favorable, Unfavorable, and Not Sure Responses: 
Alternative Financial Strategies Related to the 
Improvement of Functionally Incompetent Teachers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Parents F N N u N F F N 
Teachers F F F F N F F N 
Principals F N F u F F F N 
Superintendents F F F u N F F N 
School Board Members F N N u F F F u 
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Table 11.1. Favorable, Unfavorable, and Not Sure Responses: 
School Administrative Responsibilities 
Related to Merit Pay Implementation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Parents F F N u F F F F N N 
Teachers F F F N F F F F F N 
Principals F F F u F F F F F F 
Superintendents F F F N F F F F F F 
School Board Members F F N N F F F F N N 
Table 12 
Survey Items and Respondent's Favorable, Unfavorable, 
and Not Sure Responses to Items 
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I. MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING DECISIONS TO 
IMPLEMENT MERIT-PAY PROGRAMS IN THE SCHOOLS. FAVORABLE NOT SURE UNFAVORABLE 
1. Political endorsement of merit· pay implemen-
tation In the schools is to satisfy political 
purposes rather than improvement of educa-
tional quality. 
2. Merit pay would improve educational quality 
by motivating improved teacher performance. 
3. Merit-pay programs would exploit teachers 
rather than provide reasonable compensa-
tion for work done. 
4. Merit-pay would benefit teachers. 
5. Parents would benefit from merit pay 
Implementation. 
6. The performance gains achieved as a result of 
merit pay Implementation would justify the 
additional finances required to maintain a 
merit-pay program. 
7. General salary increases would improve teacher 
performance at least as effectively as 
merit-pay awards. 
8. The solution of school problems unrelated 
to financial Incentives would have a greater 
effect on the Improvement of teacher 
performance than would merit pay implementation. 
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II. PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS INFLUENCING 
IMPROVED TEACHER PERFORMANCE. 
1. Merit-pay awards would Improve teacher 
performance only if current salaries are 
perceived as Inadequate to meet the 
teacher's basic needs. 
2. Merit-pay awards would have little effect 
on the performance of teachers who have 
social or self-actualization needs. 
3. Teachers who establish their own standard 
of performance excellence would be 
positively Influenced by merit-pay awards. 
4. Merit-pay awards would have little effect 
on the performance of teachers who have 
security, status, or esteem needs. 
5. Merit-pay awards would more likely Improve 
the performance of those teachers who have 
low achievement needs. 
6. School district payrol I practices would 
allow school administrators to distribute 
merit-pay awards as soon as Improved 
teacher performance Is documented. 
7. In order to establish the relationship 
between performance and mrlt-pay awards, 
evaluations would have to be conducted 
more frequently than once a year. 
8. School administrators would have a 
functional understanding of those 
reinforcement theories and practices 
that relate to effective merit pay 
Implementation. 
9. School administrators would be able to 
determine when nonfinancial rewards more 
effectively Improve teacher performance 
than financial rewards. 
10. School administrators seldom reward 
Improved teacher performance. 
Ill. EVALUATION CRITERIA TO BE EMPLOYED FOR 
THE MEASUREMENT OF TEACHER PERFORMANCE 
RELATING TO MERIT-PAY AWARDS. 
1. Merit-pay evaluation would relate speclfical ly 
to those work elements the teacher has 
control over. 
2. Teacher performance ratings relating to merit-
pay awards would be based only on those work 
elements that can be objectively measured. 
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3. Subjective performance measures would be 
acceptable for determining merit-pay 
e I I g I b I I I ty. 
4. Merit-pay evaluation measures would be 
determined by teachers, school adminis-
trators, and parents. 
5. Merit-pay evaluation measures would be 
determined by teachers and school 
administrators. 
6. Merit-pay evaluation measures would be 
determined solely by school administrators. 
7. Merit-pay evaluations would be conducted 
solely by school administrative personnel 
rather than by a panel of teachers and 
school administrators. 
8. Merit-pay evaluation measures would be based 
upon organizational objectives set forth by 
school officials. 
9. Merit-pay evaluations would include 
teacher performance evaluations made 
by parents. 
10. Merit-pay ratings would refer only to the 
performance of teachers carrying out their 
normal classroom duties. 
11. Teacher style, characteristics, and 
instructional method would be the 
elements used for merit-pay evaluations. 
12. Student performance would be the key 
element used for the development of 
measures relating to merit-pay awards. 
13. Merit-pay awards may be made on the 
basis of quality as well as quantity. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL STRATEGIES RELATED 
TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF FUNCTIONALLY 
INCOMPETENT TEACHERS. 
1. Financial awards based on performance would 
Improve the performance of Incompetent teachers. 
2. Failure to receive merit-pay awards would 
cause incompetent teachers to seek ways to 
Improve their performance. 
3. Failure to receive merit-pay awards would 
cause incompetent teachers to leave the 
teaching profession. 
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4. Teacher competency Is the most critical 
Issue bearing on educational productiveness 
in the schools. 
5. Financial awards based on the acquisition of 
new knowledge and improvement of teaching 
ski I I would Improve the performance of 
Incompetent teachers. 
6. Guidance and supervision by effective teachers 
would Improve the performance of incompetent 
teachers. 
7. Incompetent teachers should be removed from 
the classroom and placed in teacher develop-
ment programs until determined able to return 
to the classroom. 
8. Dismissal would be the only appropriate action 
to be taken with regards to Incompetent teachers. 
V. SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES RELATED 
TO MERIT PAY IMPLEMENTATION. 
1. School administrators would establish policies 
and procedures simple enough for teachers to 
see the direct relationship between merit-
pay Increases and performance. 
2. School administrators would maintain lines 
of communications that allow teachers to 
provide input about the reasonableness 
and equity of performance expectations. 
3. School administrators would establish quotas 
limiting the number of teachers that would 
receive merit-pay awards. 
4. School administrators would accept 
performance failures as their ultimate 
responsibility. 
5. School administrators would maintain merit-
pay programs In which teachers contribute 
to the design and administration of the 
program. 
6. School administrators would maintain a 
committment to spend the time and effort 
necessary to maintain an effective 
merit-pay program. 
7. School administrators would be committed 
to excellence through the concerted effort 
to assure that only competent performance 
is rewarded. 
8. School administrators would distribute 
merit-pay awards on the basis of the job 
requirements and who fills the job 
rather than performance. 
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9. School administrators would set merit-pay 
rates and redefine performance 
expectations in order to control the 
amount of compensation to be received 
by teachers. 
10. School administrators would attempt to modify 
teacher performance through the use of 
merit pay rather than changing rules, 
management practices, or the job. 
Supplementary Analyses 
T, Pr, S Pa, SB 
Pr, S Pa, T. 
SB 
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Four additional analyses were conducted in order to 
identify differences that may exist within groups. The 
following analyses relating to: a) responses differences 
relating to the respondents' definition merit pay; b) 
response differences relating to the respondents' percep-
tions regarding the effect merit pay would have on inter-
personal relations in the schools; c) responses differences 
relating to the respondents' sex; and d) age are 
descriptive, and should be treated as informative and 
suggest possible considerations for future research. 
Differences within the parents group are suggested 
regarding: motiyational factors influencing decisions to 
implement merit pay programs in the schools with regards to 
how respondents.' define merit pay. Parents (4.87), defining 
merit pay as additional compensation for improved perfor-
mance agreed that merit pay would improve school 
productivity and benefit the school community's 
constituents, whereas those parents (3.63), selecting one of 
the alternate definitions were not sure. 
Differences were noted for: school administrative 
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responsibilities relating to merit pay implementation. 
Those teachers (4.76) defining merit pay as additional 
compensation for improved performance agreed that school 
administrators would maintain effective merit-pay programs, 
whereas teachers (4.43) choosing an alternate definition 
were not sure. 
Principals and school board members also indicated 
differences for: school administrative responsibilities 
related to merit pay implementation. Principals (5.27) 
and school board members (5.13) indicating that merit pay 
was additional compensation for improved performance were 
in agreement that school administrators would maintain 
effective merit-pay programs, whereas those principals 
(4.63) and school board members (4.53) selecting an 
alternate definition were less certain. 
Differences were also noted for principals defining 
merit pay as additional compensation for improved perfor-
mance with regards to: motivational factors influencing 
decisions to implement merit-pay programs in the schools. 
Principals (4.24) selecting the merit pay definition were 
not sure, whereas those principals selecting an alternate 
definition (3.50) tended to disagree that merit pay would 
improve educational productivity and benefit school 
community members. 
Differences were noted for all groups regarding 
their perceptions about the effects merit pay would have on 
interpersonal relations in the schools. ·with regards to 
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motivational factors influencing decisions to implement 
merit-pay programs in the schools, parents (2.55) and 
teachers (2.41), indicating that there will be adverse 
effects on interpersonal relations, disagree that educa-
tional productivity will be improved and school community 
members will benefit as a result of merit pay implemen-
tation. In contrast, those parents indicating that there 
would be no significant changes (4.76) or there will be a 
positive effect on interpersonal relations (5.27) agree with 
the above. Teachers indicating there will be no significant 
changes, interpersonal relations will be positively affected 
or did not know (4.48), were not sure whether merit pay 
would improve educational productivity or benefit the school 
community's members. Principals indicating there would be 
no significant changes (5.21) or interpersonal relations 
would be positively affected (5.12), agree that merit-pay 
programs would improve educational productivity and benefit 
the members of the school community. Similarily, superin-
tendents indicating there would be adverse effects on 
interpersonal relations (3.92) were not sure, whereas those 
superintendents indicating no significant changes (5.23) or 
that merit pay would have positive effects on interpersonal 
relations (5.35), agree that merit pay would improve 
educational productivity and benefit the school community's 
constituents. School board members indicating adversive 
effects resulting from merit pay implementation (3.81) were 
not sure, but those school board members indicating that 
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there would be positive effects on interpersonal relations 
(5.27) or did not know (5.38), agree that merit pay will 
positively effect educational productivity and benefit 
the school community's members. 
Differences were also noted between school board 
members with regards to: school administrative responsi-
bilities related to merit pay implementation. In those 
cases where school board members indicated adversive effects 
on interpersonal relations (3.97) or that there would be no 
significant differences (4.44), were not sure about the 
school administrator's ability to maintain an effective 
merit-pay program. Those school board members indicating 
merit pay would have a positive effect on interpersonal 
relations (4.67), agree with the above. 
Teachers indic~ting that merit pay will h~ve adverse 
effects on interpersonal relations (4.95), appeared to be 
more cognizant of the effects merit pay would have on 
incompetent teachers, whereas teachers indicating positive 
effects were not sure (4.21) ~ 
Parents, teachers, superintendents, and school board 
members indicated differences with regards to: school 
administrative responsibilities related to merit pay 
implementation. Parents were not sure (4.43) when they 
indicated that merit pay would have an adverse effect on 
interpersonal relations. Those parents indicating that 
there will be positive effects on interpersonal relations, 
or did not know (5.27), agree that superintendents will 
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maintain effective merit-pay programs. Teachers responding 
that there will be adverse effects on interpersonal 
relations were not sure (4.39), whereas teachers indicating 
there would be no significant changes or did not know 
(5.31), ~elt superintendents would maintain effective 
programs. Although superintendents were in agreement that 
they would maintain effective merit-pay programs in the 
schools, those superintendents indicating that there would 
be positive effects on interpersonal relations (5.70) were 
more committed than those who indicated there would be 
adversive effects on interpersonal relations (4.68). School 
board members, indicating that merit pay would have adverse 
effects on interpersonal relations in the schools (4.24), 
were not sure about the superintendent's committment to an 
effective merit-pay program, whereas those indicating that 
merit pay would have a positive effect on interpersonal 
relations (5.34), agree that superintendents will maintain 
effective merit-pay programs. 
Important differences were noted for teachers only 
with regards to differences in response patterns by sex. 
Male respondents were not sure (4.36) about the school 
administrator's ability to maintain effective merit-pay pro-
grams in the schools. The female respondents (5.07) agree 
that superintendents would maintain effective programs. 
Response differences were an issue with regards to 
age for: motivational factors influencing decisions to 
implement merit-pay programs in the schools. For parents, 
the age group ranging from 41 or older (5.12), were more 
likely to agree that merit pay would improve educational 
productivity and benefit the school community's members 
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than the age groups ranging from 20-40 (4.66). The response 
differences noted for principals indicates that the princi-
pals in the 31-50 group are more likely to agree (4.53) 
than those in the 50 or older group (4.02) who were not 
sure that merit-pay programs would benefit the school 
community's members and improve educational productivity. 
School board members ranging in ages 20-50 were more likely 
to agree that merit pay would improve educational 
productivity and benefit the school community's members 
(4.98) than those 51 or older (4.54). 
Differences by age were also noted for principals 
with regards to: school administrative responsibilities 
related to merit pay implementation. Those principals 
ranging from 31-40 years of age, although in agreement that 
school administrators would maintain effective merit-pay 
programs, were less committed (5.02) than those ranging 
between 41-50 years of age (5.52). 
SUMMARY 
The hypotheses that there are no differences between 
groups within dimensions, and there are no differences 
between dimensions within groups, were tested. In addition, 
an analysis of individual items was carried out in order to 
identify differences between groups with regards to 
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responses to individual items. 
Two hypotheses relating to group differences were 
rejected. Teachers differed significantly from parents, 
principals, superintendents, and school board members with 
regards to: a) motivational factors influencing decisions 
to implement merit pay programs in the schools; and b) 
psychological determinants influencing improved teacher 
performance. Teachers disagree that merit pay will improve 
educational productivity and benefit the school district's 
members, whereas parents, superintendents, and school board 
members agree that merit pay will have a positive effect on 
the productivity in the schools and benefit the school 
districts members. Principals, however, were not sure 
about these issues. Principals responded favorably to the 
psychological determinants influencing improved teacher 
performance, whereas parents, teachers, superintendents, 
and school board members were not sure whether the 
motivational factors and reinforcement principles would 
improve teacher performance. Although differences were 
obtained between teachers and parents, superintendents, and 
school board members, the differences were one of magnitude 
within the "not sure" response range, where teachers' 
responses were less favorable. 
No differences between parents, teachers, princi-
pals, superintendents, and school board members were indi-
cated for: a) evaluation criteria to be employed for the 
measurement of teacher performance relating to merit-pay 
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awards; b) alternative strategies related to the improvement 
of functionally incompetent teachers; and c) school adminis-
trative responsibilities related to merit pay implementa-
tion. Although significant differences were not determined 
at the dimension-level analysis, an examination of indi-
vidual items revealed a large number of differences among 
groups.for: a) evaluation criteria to be employed for the 
measurement of teacher performance relating to merit-pay 
awards; and b) alternative financial strategies related to 
the improvement of functionally incompetent teachers. 
Furthermore, with the exception of: school administrative 
responsibilities related to merit pay implementation, all 
dimensions exhibited considerable variation among groups 
with regards to the individual items included in each 
dimension. 
Dimension differences were found for all groups. 
One pair of dimension differences occurred in all groups. 
Parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and school 
board members responded less favorably to: psychological 
determinants influencing improved teacher performance than 
school administrative responsibilities related to merit pay 
implementation. Teachers, principals, superintendents, and 
school board members responded less favorably to: evalua-
tion criteria to be employed for the measurement of teacher 
performance relating to merit-pay awards, than school 
administrative responsibilities relating to merit pay 
implementation. In addition, parents, principals, 
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superintendents, and school board members responded less 
favorably to: alternative financial strategies related to 
the improvement of functionaliy incompetent teachers, than 
school administrative responsibilities related to merit pay 
implementation. 
Factors causing within group variation were 
suggested for future consideration. How the respondent 
defined merit pay, how the respondent perceived the effects 
that merit pay would have on interpersonal relations in the 
schools, the respondents' sex and age, may be considerations 
with regards to: a) motivational factors influencing 
decisions to implement merit-pay programs in the schools; 
b) school administrative responsibilities related to merit 
pay implementation; and c) alternative financial strategies 
relat~d to the improvement of the functionally incompetent 
teacher. 
The conclusions, discussion, and recommendations 
are presented in chapter 5. 
Chapter 5 
CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Merit pay, conceptually, is a procedure by which 
employees are awarded extra compensation in accordance with 
degrees of performance improvements exceeding the organi-
zation's acceptable performance standards. Proposals have 
been made to install merit-pay programs in the schools as a 
method to improve the schools' productivity in general, and 
improve teacher performance specifically. However, within 
the framework of education; merit pay is a controversial 
issue, requiring an in depth examination of those factors 
contributing to successful merit pay implementation. 
Within the school district, five groups have been 
identified that play an important role with regards to 
merit pay implementation in the schools. These groups are: 
a) parents, b) teachers, c) principals, d) superintendents, 
and e) school board members. Because these groups have 
different functions within the school setting, the 
determination of differences in their perceptions about 
what would occur in the schools, relative to a variety of 
issues relevant to successful merit-pay programs, is an 
essential first step to be taken prior to the program's 
installation. 
The implications of the study within the context 
of the above discussion are presented in the following: 
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1) Conclusions; 2) Discussion; and 3) Recommendations. 
Conclusions 
Differences were found between groups in two of the 
five dimensions identified for the study. In Dimension I, 
teachers were found to be less favorable towards motiva-
tional factors influencing decisions to implement merit-pay· 
programs in the schools. Dimension II--psychological 
determinants influencing improved teacher performance--
teachers and principals took polar positions, where teachers 
were not sure and principals provided responses favorable to 
merit-pay implementation. Both teachers' and principals' 
responses were significantly different from parents, 
superintendents, and school board members. Differences were 
not found between groups with regards to: a) Dimension 
III--evaluation criteria to be employed for the measurement 
of teacher performance relating to merit-pay awards; 
b) Dimension IV--alternative financial strategies related 
to the improvement of incompetent teachers; and c) Dimension 
V--school administrative responsibilities related to merit 
pay implementation. 
Teachers responded less favorably than did parents, 
principals, superintendents, and school board members to 
Dimension I. Essentially, teachers did not believe that 
merit pay would improve educational productivity or benefit 
the school community members. In contrast, parents, 
principals, superintendents, and school board members 
believed that merit pay would improve educational produc-
tivity and benefit the school community members. 
Teachers' and principals' responses were signifi-
cantly different from those of parents, superintendents, 
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and school board members with regards to Dimension II. 
However, teachers responded less favorably than did parents, 
principals, superintendents, and school board members. 
The principals' responses were more favorable than were 
those of parents, teachers, superintendents, and school 
board members. The difference between teachers and parents, 
superintendents, and school board members are less signifi-
cant in-as-much as these groups were considered to have 
given responses indicating uncertainty with regards to 
those issues contained in Dimension II. Principals, 
however, are significant in-as-much as their responses are 
considered favorable to the issues found in Dimension II. 
This suggests, that principals exhibit, a greater knowledge 
of motivators and confidence that the appropriate rein-
forcement procedures will be applied in the schools. 
Parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and 
school board members indicated uncertainty with regards to 
the evaluation criteria to be employed for the measurement 
of teacher performance relating to merit-pay awards. 
Caution must be taken not to assume that there were no 
differences in terms of individual item responses. There 
were only three issues in which all groups provided 
favorable responses. They are: a) merit-pay evaluations 
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would relate specifically to those work elements the 
teacher has control over; b) merit-pay evaluation measures 
would [not] be determined solely by school administrators; 
and c) merit-pay awards may be made on the basis of quality 
as well as quantity. The remaining responses were diverse, 
thereby indicating that evaluation procedures are not 
clearly enough defined to result in consistency among the 
groups. 
Although no differences were indicated between 
groups for Dimension IV--alternative strategies related to 
the improvement of functionally incompetent teachers--an 
examination of individual items indicate that teachers 
and principals may be more cognizant of the effects merit 
pay would have on the improvement of the incompetent 
teacher's performance, and the alternative strategies that 
would productively improve the incompetent teacher's 
performance than are parents, superintendents, and school 
board members. 
The responses for Dimension v--administrative 
responsibilities related to merit pay implementation--are 
consistent with respect to parents', teachers', principals', 
superintendents', and school board members' confidence that 
school administrators would take the necessary steps to 
maintain an effective merit-pay program. Although the 
parents and teachers responses are less favorable than 
principals, superintendents, and school board members, 
an examination of individual items support the consistency 
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of item responses favorable to merit pay. 
At this juncture, recommendations favoring the 
implementation of merit-pay programs in the schools should 
be set aside temporarily. Both the dimension-level and 
item-level analysis suggest that sufficient differences 
exist between groups to warrant the development of infor-
mation programs directed at reconciling important 
differences found between groups. 
To further complicate matters, differences are 
found between dimensions within groups. By treating the 
dimensions as a developmental sequence for the design of 
merit-pay programs, sufficient differences exist between 
the dimensions for all groups indicating weak points along 
the sequence that should be remedied prior to merit pay 
implementation. The weaknesses found common to the majority 
of groups are: a) psychological determinants influencing 
improved teacher performance; b) evaluation criteria to be 
employed for the measurement of teacher performance relating 
to merit-pay awards; and G) alternative financial strategies 
related to the improvement of functionally incompetent 
teachers. This implies that even though there is general 
support in terms of: a) motivational factors influencing 
decisions to implement merit-pay programs in the schools; 
and b) school administrative responsibilities related to 
merit pay implementation; failure of the groups to express 
certainty favorable to merit pay implementation in the 
preceding three dimensions makes the program's success 
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suspect. 
Finally, the principal assumption made was that all 
groups across all dimensions must have response patterns 
favorable to merit pay implementation. These prerequisites 
were not demonstrated. Contrary to the above assumption, 
Dimension II, Dimension III, and Dimension IV did not meet 
the above criteria since all group responses reflect 
uncertainty with regards to what would occur in the schools 
relative to those issues making up each dimension. 
In retrospect, there is, at this time, no basis for 
suggesting that effective merit-pay programs would be 
successfully installed in the California schools. This does 
not mean that consideration of merit pay should be 
abandoned, but rather, there is still considerable work to 
be done in order to assure that parents, teachers, princi-
pals, superintendents, and school board members arrive at 
some agreement with regards to issues important to success-
ful merit pay implementation. 
Discussion 
Merit pay implementation requires that there be 
sufficient trust and cooperation between school officials 
and teachers. Within the school setting this position can 
be extended to include parents who would both contribute to 
the maintenance of the program and derive benefits as a 
result of improved education for their children. 
In order to improve the trust and cooper~tion, and 
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confidence among the participants in the school district's 
merit-pay program, perceptual congruence should be achieved 
between parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and 
school board members that is favorable to merit pay with 
regards to those issues addressed by this study. An impor-
tant issue confronting the installation.of a merit pay 
program in the schools are those attitudes held by teachers 
regarding their contention that merit pay would not improve 
educational productivity nor benefit the school community 
members. A change in this attitude would seem necessary. 
However, the responsibility to initiate this change in the 
teacher's attitude must be shared by all groups in-as-much 
as the groups must be in agreement with respect to the 
evaluation procedures to be employed and how teacher 
incompetence is to be dealt with. Without consistency in 
these two areas, there is no reason to expect that teacher 
attitude changes will occur. 
The recurrent theme emphasized in the literature 
refers to the establishment of standards by which a link 
between performance and pay can be made. Consequently, 
the focal point is the development of school district 
expectations specifying what the school district's outcomes 
are to be. Once these expectations are determined, made 
known, and agreed upon by parents, teachers, principals, 
superintendents, and school board members, the distinction 
between evaluations pertaining to organizational membership 
and performance (outcomes) can be made. 
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As the evaluation procedures become more clearly 
defined relative to the expectations (outcomes), procedures 
for dealing with teacher incompetence begin to fall in place 
because the causes of teacher incompetence can be more 
readily identified. Consequently, the teacher's expecta-
tions should change with regards to their unfavorable 
position taken towards merit pay's ability to influence 
increased educational productiveness and the provision of 
benefits to the school community members. 
Essentially, steps should be taken that will assure 
the congruence between groups relative to what the schools 
are to achieve, from which, decisions can be made relative 
to those issues important to effective merit pay 
implementation. Without the achievement of favorable 
perceptual congruence among parents, teachers, principals,· 
superintendents, and school board members regarding those 
issues important to merit pay implementation, the likelihood 
of installing a successful merit-pay program becomes 
severely diminished. 
Recommendations 
The study has identified important differences 
between parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and 
school board members regarding issues important to merit pay 
implementation. Additional research is required in order 
to clarify the attitudes expressed by groups with regards 
to these issues. As a result, more intensive studies by 
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groups are called for. 
Although differences were found between groups 
further studies are required to confirm the results of this 
study. However, future studies should focus on the 
clarification of group perceptions as they relate to: 
a) the respondents' definition of merit pay; b) the respon-
dents' perception about the effect merit pay will have on 
interpersonal relations in the schools; c) the respondents' 
sex; and d) the respondents' age. 
In addition, research should be conducted to compare 
response behaviors resulting from regional characteristics 
which may be a function of the community's economic base--
a) agriculture, b) commerce, c) industry, and d) 
technology. There appear .to be levels of conservatism 
that may play an important role with regards to the 
acceptance or rejection of issues important to merit pay 
implementation. 
Teachers were the only group that disagreed with 
the assumption that merit pay would improve educational 
productiveness and benefit the school district's con-
stituents. A relationship between the teachers' rejection 
of this premise may be directly related to the absence 
of definitive evaluation procedures and methods for handling 
teacher incompetence. Studies designed to measure the rate 
of attitude change relative to precisely defined standards 
would be beneficial to the design of merit-pay programs. 
Furthermore, the examination of the internal 
consistency of the survey instrument suggests, and was 
confirmed by the various data analyses, that there was 
considerable response variation by groups within: a) 
psychological determinants influencing improved teacher 
performance; b) evaluation criteria to be employeq for 
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the measurement of teacher performance relating to merit-
pay awards; and c) alternative financial strategies related 
to the improvement of functionally incompetent teachers. 
Research designs that pre- and post-test, with an 
intervening information period relative to merit pay issues, 
would help distinguish whether the variation was due to the 
items; or whether the variation was due to lack of 
knowledge of merit-pay concepts, lack of uniformity within 
education regarding educational standards, or the 
respondents' experience within the school district. 
Concluding Comment 
In the absence of promotional opportunities in 
education, merit pay can serve as a powerful motivator, 
enhancing school productivity while providing recognition 
and financial benefit to those teachers excelling in their 
work. However, in order to achieve these objectives, 
precise definitions of the school's outcomes are required 
from which suitable performance measures can be derived. 
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November 8, 1984 
, Superintendent 
--------------------------- School District 
93001 
Dear 
The success of merit-pay programs adopted by school districts 
is affected by those opinions held by the constituents within 
the school community. Decisions regarding the implementation 
of merit pay centers on whether the differences expressed by 
parents, teachers, principals, central office administrators, 
and school board members can be reconciled. By identifying 
those differences expressed, reconciliation becomes more 
likely and as a result, a merit-pay program's chance for 
success is improved. 
Currently, I am enrolled at the University of the Pacific, 
Stockton, California, and in the dissertation phase of my 
doctoral studies. Your assisatance in the distribution of 
the questionnaire and the selection of a parent, teacher, and 
school board member respondent would be appreciated in order 
that I may identify these differences and provide you with 
a summary of the results. 
Enclosed is a self-addressed post card on which you may 
indicate your interest in participating in the study. 
Immediately following your reply, a packet containning the 
questionnaires and selection criteria will be mailed. 
Sincerely yours, 
William J. Hoff 
Dear Mr. Hoff: 
[] Please send the questionnaires. I 
will be happy to participate in 
the study. 
[] I am sorry but I do not wish to 
participate in the study. 
Comments: 
Date: , 1984 
------ Name 
00-00-N 
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October 15, 1984 
Dear 
Thank you for taking part in the study. With your 
assistance and support the study will generate information 
useful to the design of an effective merit-pay program. 
Five groups were identified for the study. They are: 
a) Parents, b) Teachers, c) Principals, d) Central Office 
Administrators, and e) School Board Members. Please select 
the respondents and distribute the questionnaires as follows: 
1. Fill out questionnaire addressed to you. 
2. Give a questionnaire to , Principal. 
3. Select and give questionnaires to: 
a. School Board Member--select the 4th school board 
member from your list of board members. 
b. Teachers--select the 20th teacher from your 
list of teachers. For ease of distribution the 
teacher may be selected from the Principal's 
school site. 
c. Parents--select the 14th parent from the above 
teacher's student list. 
Should you feel it necessary to modify the selection 
criteria, do so, but attempt to observe randomness of 
selection. 
In the event that it is necessary to follow-up a 
respondent because a questionnaire has not been returned, 
please keep a record of the respondents. 
School Board Member: 
---------------------------------
Teacher:----------------------------
Parent: 
------------------------------
Following the completion of the data analysis, a 
summary of the results will be mailed to you. 
Sincerely yours, 
William J. Hoff 
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October 15, 1984 
Dear Participant: 
Merit pay has been given renewed consideration as an 
effective way to improve teacher performance in the schools. 
However, prior to the adoption of a merit-pay plan, issues 
affecting successful merit pay implementation are to be 
considered. 
Essential to the development of sound merit-pay programs 
is the input of opinions expressed by those who are to 
benefit from the program. Your opinions on those issues 
presented in the enclosed questionnaire are improtant.tq the 
design of an effective merit-pay program. 
Please complete the questionnaire and return promptly 
using the attached self-addressed, postage paid envelope. 
All individual responses will be treated as confidential 
communications between the researcher and the participant. 
Thank you for taking the time from your busy schedule 
and contributing to the research being undertaken. 
Sincerely yours, 
William J. Hoff 
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December 5, 1984 
Dear 
A preliminary examination of the data suggest a wide 
variety of differences among the respondents with regards to 
a number of issues addressed by the questionnaire related to 
merit pay. Enclosed are trends that appear to be emerging 
for several issues frequently discussed in the literature. 
However, conclusive statements can not be made until the 
outstanding questionnaires are returned. 
I have received your questionnaire along with the 
Teacher and Principal respondents. Responses from the 
Parent and School Board Member respondents have not been 
received. 
Enclosed are additional questionnaires in case the 
respondents have misplaced the first questionnaire 
distributed. Sometimes irregularities arise that cannot 
be controlled for. Should a respondent not wish to 
participate, please select a substitute respondent. 
Thank you for taking the time from your busy schedule 
and providing the assistance needed to conduct this 
study. 
Sincerely yours, 
William J. Hoff 
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December 5, 1984 
Dear 
A request was made asking your assistance in the 
selection of respondents and the distribution of question-
naires for a merit-pay study directed at determining the 
differences among parents, teachers, principals, 
superintendents, and school board members on issues important 
to merit pay implementation. The questionnaires were mailed 
to you. As of this date, I have not received any responses 
from your district. 
It is understood, with the demands placed on your time, 
priorities must be set, giving emphasis to the most pressing 
school .matters. Your participation is needed in order that 
I meet the deadlines set for the completion of the study. 
Please give the questionnaires your immediate attention. 
Enclosed are trends that appear to be emerging for 
several issues frequently discussed in the literature. 
However, conclusive statements can not be made until the 
outstanding questionnaires are returned. 
I am looking forward to hearing from you soon. 
Sincerely yours, 
William J. Hoff 
APPENDIX II 
SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
PERCEPTUAL DETERMINANTS AFFECTING MERIT PAY IMPLEMENTATION 
IN CALIFORNIA SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
INSTRUCTIONS: The following questlonaire consists of five dimensions containing statements related 
to merit pay Implementation in the schools. Please check either a 3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, or -3 as your 
choice relates to your degree of agreement or disagreement with each statement's relevance to merit 
pay Implementation. Choices 3, 2, and 1. indicate your degree of agreement; choices -1, -2, and -3 
Indicate your degree of disagreement; and zero (0) indicates "not sure." The time required to 
complete the questionaire Is approximately 15 MINUTES. 
I • MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING DECISIONS TO 
IMPLEMENT MERIT-PAY PROGRAMS IN THE SCHOOLS. AGREE s~~\: DISAGREE 
1 • Political endorsement of merit pay Implementation in (31 [21 [ 11 £01 £-11 [-21 [-31 
the schools is to satisfy political purposes rather 
than improvement of educational productivity. 
2. Merit pay would improve educational productivity by (31 (21 [1] [OJ (-11 [-21 [-31 
motivating Improved teacher performance. 
3. Merit-pay programs would exploit teachers rather than [31 !21 [ 1 J !OJ [-11 [-21 (-31 
provide reasonable compensation for work done. 
4. Merit-pay programs would benefit teachers. £3) (21 [1] [01 (-11 t-21 [-31 
5. Parents would benefit from merit pay implementation. [31 [21 [1] [0] [-11 [-21 [-31 
6. The performance gains achieved as a result of merit [31 [21 [11 [01 [-11 [-21 [-31 
pay Implementation would Justify the additional 
finances required to maintain a merit-pay program. 
7. General salary increases would improve teacher [3] [21 [1] [0] [-11 [-21 [-31 
performance at least as effectively as merit-pay awards. 
8. The solution of school problems unrelated to financial (31 [2] [ 1 1 [01 [-1] [-21 [-31 
incentives would have a greater effect on the 
improvement of teacher performance than would merit 
pay Implementation. 
I I • PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS INFLUENCING IMPROVED 
TEACHER PERFORMANCE. 
1. Merit-pay awards would Improve teacher performance {31 [21 [11 {01 [-11 [-21 [-31 
only If current salaries are perceived as Inadequate 
to meet the teacher's basic needs. 
2. Merit-pay awards would have little effect on the [31 [21 [ 11 (0] [-11 [-21 [-31 
performance of teachers who have social or 
self-actualization needs. 
3. Teachers who establish their own standards of [3] !21 [ 11 !OJ (-11 [-21 [-31 
performance excel fence would be positively 
influenced by merit-pay awards. 
4. Merit-pay awards would have little effect on the £31 [21 ( 1 1 [0] [-1] [-21 [-31 
performance of teachers who have security, status, 
or esteem needs. 
5. Merit-pay awards would more I ikely .improve the £31 [21 [1] [0] [-1] [-21 [-31 
performance of those teachers who have low 
achievement motivation. 
6. School district payroll practices would allow £31 £21 [11 [01 [-1! [-21 [-31 
school administrators to distribute merit-pay 
awards as soon as improved teacher performance 
Is documented. 
7. In order to establish the relationship between [31 [ 21 [11 [OJ [-11 [-21 [-31 
performance and merit-pay awards, merit-pay 
evaluations would have to be conducted more 
frequently than once a year. 
a. School administrators would have a functional [31 [21 [1] [01 [-11 [-21 [-31 
understanding of those reinforcement theories. 
and practices that relate to effective merit 
pay Implementation. 
9. School administrators would be able to determine !31 [21 [ 1 ] [0] [-1 1 [-21 (-31 
when nonfinancial rewards more effectively improve 
teacher performance than financial rewards. 
10. School administrators seldom reward Improved (3] [21 [lJ [01 [-11 (-21 (-31 
teacher performance. 
------
I II • EVALUATION CRITERIA TO BE EMPLOYED FOR THE 
MEASUREMENT OF TEACHER PERFORMANCE RELATING 
TO MERIT-PAY AWARDS. 
1 • Merit-pay evaluation would relate specifically to £31 !21 [ 11 (01 (-1 J [-21 [-31 
those work elements the teacher has control over. 
2. Teacher performance ratings relating to merit-pay (3] (21 [ 1 1 [01 [-11 [-21 [-31 
awards would be based only on those work elements 
that can be objectively measured. 
3. Subjective performance measures would be acceptable [3] [2] [ 1 ] [01 [-1] [-21 [-31 
for determining merit-pay eligibility. 
4. Merit-pay evaluation measures would be determined [3] [2J [ 1 ] [01 !-11 (-21 [-31 
by teachers, school administrators, and parents. 
5. Merit-pay evaluation measures would be determined [31 [2] [lJ (OJ [-11 [-21 (-31 
by teachers and school administrators. 
6. Merit-pay evaluation measures would be determined !31 [2J [1] [0] [-11 [-21 [-31 
solely by school administrators. 
7. Merit-pay evaluations would be conducted solely by [31 [2] [1 J [01 [-11 [-21 [-31 
school administrative personnel rather than by a 
panel of teachers and school administrators. 
a. Merit-pay evaluation measures would be based upon [31 [21 [11 [01 [-11 [-21 [-3J 
organizational objectives set forth by school off icl a Is. 
9. Merit-pay evaluations would Include teacher [31 [21 ( 1 J [01 (-11 [-21 [-31 
performance evaluations made by parents. 
10. Merit-pay ratings would refer only to the performance [31 [21 (1] [01 (-11 (-21 [-31 
of the teachers carrying out their normal classroom 
duties. 
11. Teacher style, characteristics, and instructional (3] [2J [11 [01 [ ··11 [-21 (-31 
method would be the elements used for merit-pay 
evaluations. 
2 
12. Student performance would be the key element used 
for the development of teacher performance 
measures relating to merit-pay awards. 
13. Merit-pay awards may be made on the basis of 
quality of performance as wei I as quantity. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL STRATEGIES RELATED TO THE 
IMPROVEMENT OF FUNCTIONALLY INCOMPETENT TEACHERS. 
1. Financial awards based on performance would improve 
the performance of incompetent .teachers. 
2. Failure to receive merit-pay awards would cause 
incompetent teachers to seek ways to improve 
their performance. 
3. Failure to receive merit-pay awards would cause 
Incompetent teachers to leave the teaching profession. 
4. Teacher competency is the most critical Issue 
bearing on educational productiveness in the schools. 
5. Financial awards based on the acquisition of new 
knowledge and Improvement ot teaching ski I Is would 
improve the performance of incompetent teachers. 
6. Guidance and supervision by effective teachers would 
Improve the performance of incompetent teachers. 
7. Incompetent teachers should be removed from the 
classroom and placed in teacher development 
programs until determined able to return to 
the classroom. 
8. Dismissal would be the only appropriate action to 
be taken with regards to Incompetent teachers. 
V. SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES RELATED 
TO MERIT-PAY IMPLEMENTATION. 
1. School administrators would establish policies ·and 
procedures simple enough tor teachers to see the 
direct relationship between merit-pay Increases 
and performance. 
2. School administrators would maintain lines of 
communications that allow teachers to provide input 
about the reasonableness and equity of performance 
expectations. 
3. School administrators would establish quotas 
limiting the number of teachers that would 
receive merit-pay awards. 
4. Schoo I· administrators wou I d accept performance 
failures as their ultimate responsibility. 
5. School administrators would maintain merit-pay 
programs in which teachers contribute to the 
design and administration of the program. 
3 
£31 £21 £11 COJ C-11 [-21 C-3 
[31 !21 [11 [01 [-11 [-21 [-3j 
[31 [2] [ 11 [01 [-1J [-21 [-31 
[31 [2] [ 11 [0] [-1J [-2J (-31 
C3J £21 [11 [OJ C-1J [-21 !-31 
[31 [21 [1] [OJ (-11 [-21 [-3] 
[31 !21 [ 11 [QJ [-1] [-21 [-31 
£31 [21 £11 !OJ [-11 !-21 !-31 
[3] !21 [ 11 [01 [-11 [-21 [-31 
!31 [2] [1] 101 [-11 [-21 [-31 
!31 £21 £11 !OJ £-11 £-21 C-31 
£31 £21 !11 !01 £-11 C-21 t-31 
[31 [21 [ 11 [0] !-11 [-21 (-31 
[3] !21 [ 1 l [OJ !-11 !-21 !-31 
[3] [21 !11 (0] !-1 l !-2] [-3] 
6. School administrators would maintain a committment 
to spend the time and effort necessary to maintain 
an effective merit-pay program. 
(3] [2] [ 11 [01 {-11 [-21 {· 
7. School administrators would be committed to 
excellence through the concerted effort to 
£31 £21 [11 [0] [-11 [-21 {-
assure that only competent performance is rewarded. 
a. School administrators would distribute merit-pay 
awards on the basis of the job requirements and 
who fills the job rather than performance • 
[3] [21 [1] [0] {-1] [-21 [-2 
. 9. School administrators would set merit-pay rates 
and redefine performance expectations In order 
to control the amount of compensation to be 
received by teachers. 
[3] [21 £11 [01 £-11 [-21 [-3 
10. School administrators would attempt to modify 
teacher performance through the use of merit pay 
rather than changing rules, management practices, 
or the job. 
[3] £21 [1] [0] [-11 [-21 [-31 
Please answer the following questions by checking one response only. 
1. Which statement defines Merit Pay as you understand the concept. 
a. Teachers are awarded additional compensation by advancing to higher job classifications 
as a result of professional improvement. 
b. Teachers are awarded additional compensation for extra duties, longer work year, and/or 
serving In high priority locations. 
c. Teachers are awarded additional compensation for performance that exceeds acceptable 
performance standards. 
d. Teachers are awarded additional compensation for guidance and supervision of other 
teachers, and curriculum development in addition to assuming partial teaching 
responsibilities. 
e. Don't know. 
2. Which statement describes the effect merit pay implementation will have on interpersonal 
relations In the schools. 
a. There will be no significant changes In the interpersonal relations among teachers. 
b. There will be increased ill-feelings, lack of cooperation, and a highly competitive 
atmosphere that adversely effects teacher performance. 
c. There will be less animosity among teachers and performance gains will be noted 
because high performing teachers wll I be identified and rewarded appropriately. 
d. Don't know 
3. You are: male female 4 • Your age i s: 
20-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
Over 60 
'1ENTS: 
4 
APPENDIX III 
LISTING OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
DRAWN FOR THE STUDY 
1'39 
CALIFORNIA SCHOOL DISTRICTS PARTICIPATING 
IN THE STUDY 
The following school districts were drawn from regional 
lists provided by the Association of California School 
Administrators, ACSA Headquarters, Burlingame, California. 
Region 1 
Trinity Union High 
Susanville Elementary 
Canyon Union Elementary 
Region 2 
Placer Union High 
Palmero Union Elementary 
Golden Feather Union Elem. 
Region 3 
Grant Joint Union High 
Esparto Unified 
Region 4 
Old Adobe Union Elem. 
Santa Rosa HSD 
Petaluma Joint Union High 
Region 5 
Belmont Elementary 
Sequoia Union High 
South San Francisco Unified 
Region 7 
Ripon Unified 
Hughson Unified 
Tracy City Schools 
Lincoln Unif<iied 
Region 8 
Lorna Prieta Joint Union 
Elementary 
Gilroy Unified 
Morgan Hill Unified 
Mt. Pleasant Elem. 
Region 9 
Washington Joint Union 
Elementary 
Clovis Unified 
Region 10 
Soquel Elementary 
Monterey Peninsula Unified 
Mission Union Elementary 
Region 11 
Lemoore Union High 
Muroc Unified 
Taft Union High 
Pioneer Union Elementary 
Region 12 
Beaumont Unified 
Elsinore Union High 
Romoland Elementary 
Region 13 
College Elementary 
Ventura Unified 
Solvang Elementary 
Region 14 
Manhattan Beach Elementary 
South Bay Union High 
Hermosa Beach City Elem. 
Region 15 
Little Lake City Elem. 
Hacienda La Puente Unified 
Valle Lindo Elementary 
Region 17 
Huntington Beach Union High 
Capistrano Unified 
Region 18 
Carlsbad Unified 
Central Union High 
